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WHAT JAPAN WANTS 



"A man whose judgment can be wholly respected, and 
who is not accustomed to saying or doing wild things. 
He knows whereof he speaks." 

— Benjamin Ide Wheeler^ 
Pres* Emeritus, JJniv, of California, 



WHAT JAPAN 

WANTS 



BY 

YOSHI S. KUNO 

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, ORIENTAL DEPARTMENT, UNIVERSITY OF 
CALIFORNIA, BERKBLEY, CALIF. 



NEW YORK 

THOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS 






Copyright, 1921, 
Bt THOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY 



SEP 24 '^i 



PRINTED IN U. S. A. 



§)CU622964 



FOREWORD 

It is the purpose of this small volume to set 
forth plainly and without bias what Japan 
wants both at home and abroad. The author 
would request the reader to bear in mind 
that the material contained in the first six 
chapters portrays existing conditions and does 
not of necessity reflect his personal ideals and 
policies. However, the solutions offered both 
in these and in the concluding chapter, being 
based upon knowledge gained through years 
of extensive research work, set forth his per- 
sonal opinions as to what Japan and other 
nations should do. The mission of this trea- 
tise is therefore twofold: 

First, to acquaint Occidental readers with 
the state of public opinion in Japan regard- 
ing these various subjects. 

Second, to formulate plans for the solution 
of the numerous problems involved. 

yoSHI S. KUNO. 
August 2S, ig2I, 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I. WHAT JAPAN WANTS IN 

AMERICA 

Development of Japanese Civilization — Americans Contri- 
bution — Immigration Question — Gentlemen's Agree- 
ment — Anti-Alien Law — Treatment of Japanese in 
the United States — Mutual Respect of Rights and 
Privileges — Naturalization in Japan and in the 
United States — Possibility of War between Japan 
and the United States Page 3 

CHAPTER II. WHAT JAPAN WANTS ON 
THE PACIFIC OCEAN 

Former Attitude of Compromise on Questions of the 
Pacific — Political Expansion of both Japan and the 
United States — Problem of Control of the Pacific — 
Anglo- Japanese Alliance — Hawaii — Yap — The 
Philippines Page 27 

CHAPTER III. WHAT JAPAN WANTS IN 

CHINA 

Early Relations of the United States with Oriental 
Peoples — ^The Open Door Policy — Japan's Attitudes 
Toward China Contrasted — Japanese Concessions — 
Shantung — Japanese Loans — ^A United or a Divided 
China Page 47 

CHAPTER IV. WHAT JAPAN WANTS IN 

KOREA 

Prc-Annexatlon P.elatlons — Post-Annexation Conditions — 
Character of Administration — Uprising of 1919 — 
Agriculture, Fishing and Mining — Fusion of Races 
— Restoration of Korean Dynasty . • • Page 67 

vii 



viii Contents 

CHAPTER V. WHAT JAPAN WANTS IN 

SIBERIA 

Yellow Man's Land — Vladivostok — Establishment of 
Trade Route — Bolsheviki — Far East Republic at 
Chita — Japan's Population Problem — Japan's Raw 
Material Problem — Resentment of Interference — 
Japanese Inland Sea Pagf 85 

CHAPTER VI. WHAT JAPAN WANTS AT 

HOME 

Transformation upon Introduction of Occidental Civiliza- 
tion — Reconstruction and Domestic Development — 
Desire for Democracy — Unpopularity of Foreign 
Policy — Franchise — Labor Question — Industrial 
and Commercial Expansion — Limitation of Ar- 
mament — Religion — Woman — Period of Tran- 
sition Page 95 

CHAPTER VII. WHAT JAPAN AND OTHER 
NATIONS SHOULD DO 

Rise of Japan Accredited Largely to Diplomacy — Dual 
Methods of Japanese and Chinese Diplomacy Should 
be Studied Together — China's Methods of Diplo- 
macy as Exemplified in Liao-tung Affair, and by 
Present-Day Propaganda in the United States — 
Japan's Occidental Method of Diplomacy as Ex- 
emplified in the Gentlemen's Agreement — Efficiency 
of Mutual Retaliation — Japan's Oriental Method 
of Diplomacy as Exemplified in Her Dealings with 
Korea and China — Relation of China to Japan Com- 
pared with That of Mexico to the United States — 
Elbow Room for Japan's Population — Methods 
Looking Toward Maintenance of Permanent Peace 
Between the United States and Japan — Steps Toward 
Solution of Difficulties Between China and Japan — 
Race Equality — Proper Recognition of Japan Essen- 
tial to World Peace Page 127 



CHAPTER I 

WHAT JAPAN WANTS IN AMERICA 

Without question, Japan may rightly claim 
to be the oldest existing empire in the world. 
Furthermore, she holds the unique distinction 
of having been ruled throughout by the same 
Imperial line. Although, according to tra- 
dition, the Empire was founded in 660 B.C.^ 
Occidental scholars, versed in the history of 
Japan, and even prominent native historians 
hesitate to place the date earlier than that of 
the founding of the Roman Empire, or about 
the time of the beginning of the Christian 
era. 

During this long period of her national 
existence, Japan has undergone four great 
national reformations. The first of these, 
which was consequent upon the introduction 



4 What Japan Wants In America 



of Chinese civilization and methods of gov- 
ernment, took place in 640 A.D., the second 
v^as consummated by the completion of the 
system of feudal government in 1192. Japan 
entered upon the work of the third in 1854, 
w^hen the country was re-opened to Occidental 
civilization by Commodore Perry. The 
Great War of 1914 marks the beginning of 
the fourth period of reformation. 

The strength of the nation was rooted in 
the work of the first and second reformations, 
while through the third and fourth, Modern 
Japan has come to rank as one of the five 
leading powers of the world. The third 
reformation was concerned chiefly with the 
introduction of Western ideas, principally 
from the United States. The fourth is also 
being carried out largely along American 
lines. Therefore, "What Japan Wants" is a 
question of vital importance in America as 
well as in Japan. 

In considering the question "What Japan 
Wants in America," we are confronted with 



(What Japan Wants in America 5 

many grave problems. Of these, the ques- 
tion of immigration is the most warmly dis- 
cussed at the present time. However, in so 
far as the United States is concerned, Japa- 
nese immigration is already a closed matter. 
Ever since the United States and Japan 
entered into the Gentlemen's Agreement in 
1907, Japan has strictly adhered to the terms 
of the compact, and no Japanese immigrants 
have been permitted to land in Continental 
United States. Although, like Brazil,^ Mex- 
ico is exceedingly friendly to Japan and 
welcomes immigrants from that country, yet, 
according to the terms of the Gentlemen's 

^Wlth regard to Japanese emigration to Brazil, it 
IS undeniable that there are many Japanese firms and pro- 
moters operating in Japan for the purpose of assisting 
emigrants to go thither, as well as to Chile and Peru, 
where the Japanese also find a welcome. During the past 
five years the percentage of Japanese emigrating to Bra- 
zil has been very much higher than formerly. Although, 
before the Great War, there were but a few thousand 
Japanese in Brazil, today there are approximately 40,000. 
Still, numerically, they constitute but a negligible element. 
Furthermore, Japan as a nation would greatly prefer 
elbow room on the Asiatic continent to having her sons 
and daughters go so far from home. 



6 What Japan Wants in America 



Agreement, Japan may not permit emi- 
gration to Mexico because of her contiguity 
to the United States. 

Although none can foresee the outcome of 
the discussion of Japan's relations with the 
United States, now in progress at Washing- 
ton, still the question of exclusion of Japanese 
immigrants from the United States is no 
longer an open one requiring the further 
attention of statesmen and diplomats. 

When one nation enters into diplomatic 
negotiations with another, it should be pre- 
pared as if for war. In military encounter, 
no matter how great the stores of ammuni- 
tion, how perfect the equipment, or how 
well-trained the men, no prudent general 
risks a battle without first sending out scouts 
to reconnoiter the field and gather informa- 
tion as to the position, strength, and plans of 
the enemy. Likewise, in the diplomatic duel, 
the representatives of the nation, far-sighted, 
keen, and well-trained though they may be, 
are not in a position to conclude a satisfac- 



IWhat Japan Wants in America 7 

tory treaty or agreement with a foreign power 
unless they are well-versed in the laws, cus- 
toms, manners, and historical usages of that 
people. 

, Following the Chino-Japan War, the Jap- 
anese began to migrate to the United States 
in ever-increasing numbers. At the close 
of the war with Russia, the rate of increase 
of such emigration was greatly augmented. 
The Japanese question then became a serious 
one in California. In deference to the ex- 
pressed desire of many Californians, the fed- 
eral government showed some inclination to 
extend the provisions of the Chinese Exclu- 
sion Law to include the Japanese. Although 
Japan recognized the situation and even 
agreed to stop sending emigrants, yet she 
made strong objection to having Japanese 
subjects treated in the same way as were the 
Chinese. 

Thereupon a compromise method, known 
as the Gentlemen's Agreement, was entered 
into. By its provisions, Japan agreed to 



8 What Japan Wants in America 



check the coming of Japanese laborers by 
refusing to issue passports to them; and in 
turn, the United States promised to treat 
Japanese who should come provided with 
passports the same as immigrants from Eu- 
rope. This agreement became known as the 
Gentlemen's Agreement, because both Japan 
and the United States promised to live up to 
its terms as the honor of a gentleman would 
dictate. 

On the whole, the Gentlemen's Agreement 
has been faithfully adhered to. However, it 
has functioned in a most unexpected way, and 
the outcome is a condition entirely unfore- 
seen. Instead of checking immigration as 
was intended, the agreement has brought 
about directly opposite results, and many 
perplexing problems have arisen therefrom. 

Perhaps no people in the world are more 
home-loving than are the Japanese. Indeed, 
the home-loving characteristic has become a 
sort of second nature to them. This is prob- 
ably to be attributed to the policy adopted by 



What Japan Wants in America 9 

the Japanese Government in 1638. After 
Japan had completely exterminated Catholi- 
cism, and had driven all foreigners from her 
shores, most drastic policies were put in force. 
Not only were foreigners prohibited from 
coming to Japan as either missionaries or 
traders, but the Japanese themselves were 
strictly forbidden to go to foreign countries, 
the penalty being death, if detected in an 
effort to embark. In order to make it well- 
nigh impossible for Japanese to go abroad, 
the government destroyed all ships larger 
than fifty tons. 

When Commodore Perry entered Japan in 
18S3, he found its people both content to stay 
at home and without means of going abroad. 
An interesting though sad thing took place 
with the coming of Perry. The most famous 
statesman of his day, Shoin Yoshida, who was 
in fact the real founder of modern Japan, 
strongly opposed the reopening of the Empire 
to foreign trade. However, being a man of 
foresight, he believed it would be wise to 



10 ^Vhat Japan Wants in America 



visit foreign countries for the purpose of dis- 
covering how Japan might best be able to 
reject foreign demands. With this in mind, 
Yoshida went aboard Perry's ship in the dead 
of night, and asked that Perry take him to 
America so that he might learn something of 
the customs of the people of the United 
States. 

In order to avoid violation of the law of 
Japan, Perry denied the request. The act of 
Yoshida in attempting to go to a foreign 
country made him amenable to punishment 
under the law, and later became a contribut- 
ing cause to his decapitation at the hands of 
the Japanese Government.^ 

Such being the condition, after the nation 
had been forced to reopen her ports and had 
again engaged in foreign trade, Japanese 
trade was for many years conducted wholly 
by Occidentals residing in the open ports of 
Japan. It was only after the Chino-Japan 

^ The entire story may be found in the "Life of Shoin 
Yoshida," by Robert Louis Stevenson. 



,What Japan Wants in America 11 

War, less than thirty years ago, that Japan 
really entered into her modern national life. 
A decade later came the war with Russia. 
These two ^^^ars placed the economic condi- 
tion of Japan upon an entirely different basis. 
Through them she had come to know and to 
be influenced by the outside world. Al- 
though the Japanese as a whole still contin- 
ued to be a home-loving people, there are two 
reasons why numbers of them began migrat- 
ing to the United States. First, a thousand 
dollars was, in those days, abundant capital 
with which to purchase, equip, and stock a 
farm in Japan. Therefore, in the beginning, 
those Japanese who came to the United States 
did so with the idea of earning enough money 
to enable them to return to Japan and buy a 
farm. The second reason for their coming is 
to be found in the fact that ere long the 
Japanese working in the United States dis- 
covered that this was a country in which they 
could make large sums of money in a very 
short time. Consequently, in 1906-07, after 



12 What Japan Wants in America 

the close of the war with Russia, which had 
all but bankrupted Japan, emigration to 
the United States increased by leaps and 
bounds. The Japanese question then assumed 
serious proportions in California, and agita- 
tion followed, the outgrowth of which was 
the Gentlemen's Agreement in 1907. 

By this compact the Japanese covenanted 
not to permit either skilled or unskilled labor 
to enter Continental United States, and speci- 
fied merchants, professional men, students, 
the wives or husbands of persons living in 
the United States, their fathers and mothers, 
and dependent children as those qualified to 
have passports issued to them. 

For several years after this agreement was 
entered into the Japanese question practically 
lapsed, as the Japanese in California saw no 
way of meeting the situation. In fact, prior 
to 1911, most of the Japanese in the State 
were males. Plans were, however, finally 
formulated. The Japanese Association was 
organized, Japanese schools were established, 



What Japan Wants in America 13 

and Japanese residents in California who had 
wives in Japan sent for them, while many 
bachelors imported Picture Brides. Those 
with parents or children brought them to this 
country also. Upon arrival, many brides 
worked as housemaids, while in other cases 
whole families worked together either in the 
fields or in the fisheries. In addition to those 
thus brought into the United States, the num- 
ber of Japanese in the State was steadily aug- 
mented by the high birth-rate on California 
soil. Thus did the Japanese come to establish 
settlements within the United States and to 
organize a government within a government. 
As a result, the control of the minor agricul- 
tural products of California, such as potatoes, 
tomatoes, berries, green vegetables, etc., and 
also to a great extent, particularly in south- 
ern California, of the fishing industry, has 
passed into the hands of the Japanese. There- 
fore, in spite of the Gentlemen's Agreement, 
the Japanese population has continued to in- 
crease and the Japanese question has assumed 



14 What Japan Wants in America 



grave proportions from an economic and 
agricultural standpoint. 

To meet this situation, the California Leg- 
islature passed the Anti-Alien Law in 1913/ 
Seven years later this law, having proven in- 
effective, Amendment I ' was placed on the 
ballot. Prior to Election Day, the Japanese 
sought in many ways to bargain with the peo- 
ple of California by making certain conces- 
sions with the hope that the amendment 
would not pass. An example of this is found 
in their voluntary surrender of the right to 
bring Picture Brides. Nevertheless, in spite 
of their efforts, the Japanese soon realized 

^ According to the provisions of the Anti-AHen Law, 
foreigners ineligible to naturalization may neither buy 
nor inherit land in California; neither may they lease 
agricultural land for a period exceeding three years. 
However, city lots for industrial and residence purposes 
may be leased for the same length of time for which land 
in Japan is leased to foreigners according to treaty pro- 
visions. At present the longest term of lease obtainable 
in Japan is 99 years. 

^ Amendment I prohibits entirely the leasing of agri- 
cultural land by aliens ineligible to naturalization. It 
also prohibits parents becoming guardians of minors in 
whose names land is purchased. 



^hat Japan Wants in America 15 

that the amendment would surely pass. There- 
upon, the Japanese Association, in conjunc- 
tion with the office of the Japanese Consul- 
General in San Francisco, exerted itself so 
that all possible opportunity might be af- 
forded women in Japan to obtain passports 
before the last day of their issue, which was 
set for the end of February, 1920. 

Though Amendment I appears drastic 
enough, ere long California will rub her 
eyes and wake up to the fact that it is equally 
ineffective as the law of 1913. There are at 
present more than a thousand native sons of 
Japanese parentage in California who are 
steadily approaching maturity, and who will 
have legal Tight to organize corporations and 
thereby purchase land. Taking into consid- 
eration the number of these native sons, it is 
easy to see that hundreds of such corporations 
might be organized. Should sympathetic 
Japanese millionaires, such as Baron Shibu- 
sawa, decide to advance the money, nothing 
would prevent the Japanese buying all the 



16 yt'hat Japan Wants in America 



land they wanted ; neither could the govern- 
ment of California, equipped with its present 
laws, lift a hand to prevent them. Under 
the protection of corporations thus organized, 
unnaturalized Japanese would be able to con- 
tinue in agricultural work. 

The subject, therefore, that requires seri- 
ous consideration is how the Japanese resi- 
dent in the United States should be dealt with. 
Californians should realize that, unassimila- 
ble and undesirable as they may consider the 
Japanese, those who are already within the 
confines of the State cannot be deported. The 
burning question is, "Are they to be isolated 
or Americanized?" Are the fires of race 
hatred and suspicion to be constantly rekin- 
dled, or are these people to be Christianized 
and assimilated? Should it not be the ambi- 
tion of every true American, though it may 
take a generation or two, to make loyal citi- 
zens of this foreign element? 

Among the many things that Japan wants 
in America is that the American people as a 



What Japan Wants In America 17 

-whole attain a better understanding of the 
obligations of the United States to Japan ac- 
cording to treaty stipulations and other agree- 
ments. Recent acts in California prove con- 
clusively that even among the educated class, 
this sort of knowledge is entirely lacking. 
For instance, in San Francisco, the center of 
the state's commerce, and in Berkeley, the 
center of education and culture, men who 
stand high in civil life hold meetings and dis- 
cuss with great earnestness the question of 
segregating the Japanese and compelling 
them to reside in certain specified districts. 

Another example of this lack of knowledge 
is found in the enactment of the Alien Poll 
Tax Law, the intent of which was to strike 
at the Japanese. This was passed with an 
overwhelming majority in the initiative at 
the recent state election. Then the bill passed 
with a good majority in each house of the 

-State legislature, finally becoming a law by 

Jbcing signed by the governor. 

Whether the Japanese may be segregated 



18 What Japan Wants in America 

or not, and whether or no the Alien Poll Tax 
Law is operative can be readily ascertained 
by turning to the treaty of Amity and Com- 
merce entered into between the United States 
and Japan. Therefore, Japan desires that 
Americans as a whole, and Californians in 
particular, inform themselves regarding the 
status of Japanese resident in the United 
States before taking action against them. 
Near the head of the list of what Japan 
wants in America, therefore, stands fair treat- 
ment of Japanese already admitted to the 
United States. 

Some Japanese, however, have taken an 
extreme position with regard to how Japa- 
nese should be treated in America, and have 
gone so far as to demand that Japanese be 
permitted to become naturalized citizens un- 
der the present laws of the United States. 
Such demand, besides being ridiculous, sav- 
ors of insincerity. In Japan, it is the com- 
mon custom, when Japanese meet with Chi- 
nese at any public gathering or banquet, for 



What Japan Wants in America 19 

their first words of greeting to be ''Dobun 
doshu," which means, 'We are people who 
use the same language and belong to the 
same race." Then they go on to say that 
because of this, Chinese and Japanese must 
be friends under all circumstances. Although 
the Japanese talk in this way at home and on 
the Asiatic continent, when they come to 
America, however, they demand the privi- 
lege of naturalization, while knowing well 
that the Chinese as Mongolians cannot be 
naturalized. - They contend, in explanation, 
that Japanese are not Mongolians, and that 
therefore they should be naturalized. Any 
person with some knowledge of Japanese 
history and of the naturalization laws of 
the United States, can readily see that the 
Japanese belong to a race to which the fran- 
chise is not t'xtended under the present laws. 
However, though such is the existing state 
of affairs, the United States may find some 
solution to this question in order to meet the 
need. For instance. Congress might pass a 



20 What Japan Wants In America 

franchise law similar to that passed during 
the recent war, which made it possible for 
all foreigners who joined the United States 
forces during the Great War to take out citi- 
zenship papers. Should a law be passed 
permitting the naturalization of all Japanese 
already within the United States, the whole 
question, including the Anti-Alien Law, the 
Alien Poll Tax Law, etc., would be auto- 
matically solved. 

However, should the Japanese be natural- 
ized under present conditions, unforeseen dif- 
ficulties would arise. The United States 
should permit the Japanese on her soil to 
become naturalized only on condition that 
Japan revise her law regarding naturaliza- 
tion and expatriation. According to the pres- 
ent law, foreigners who have lived in Japan 
for five consecutive years may be naturalized 
provided they are of good moral character 
and have sufficient means of support. How- 
ever, should such persons after naturalization 
expatriate themselves from Japan, they would 



What Japan Wants in America 21 

never again be permitted to become Japa- 
nese subjects. On the other hand, Japanese 
born either in Japan or in a foreign country 
are permitted to expatriate themselves and 
become citizens or subjects of foreign na- 
tions, provided they take such steps before 
the age of seventeen, or after they have either 
been exempted from or have served in mili- 
tary duty. These Japanese who have thus 
expatriated themselves may at any time 
re-become Japanese subjects, provided they 
establish a domicile within the bounds of the 
Empire of Japan. 

This law, while severe to foreigners, is 
lenient to Japanese. Though probably remote 
from the purpose of the framers of the law, 
one might reasonably interpret it as an arti- 
fice on the part of Japan by which her sub- 
jects might become citizens of foreign na- 
tions in order to enjoy full rights and privi- 
leges in other countries, with the view of 
later returning to allegiance to their mother 
country. The Japanese Government should 



22 What Japan Wants in America 



revise this law so that a Japanese who ex- 
patriates himself should never again be per- 
mitted to become a subject of Japan. This 
would obviate the danger of a hyphenated 
loyalty. 

After the right to become American citi- 
zens had been accorded to the Japanese, 
should persons engaged in agricultural pur- 
suits for more than ten years evince no 
desire to become American citizens, such per- 
sons might be termed "undesirable foreign- 
ers." Agricultural land owned by them 
might be condemned by the state, and the 
privilege of engaging in agricultural work 
might be denied them. By this method, 
within a decade, the agricultural land of the 
state would be redeemed from the tenure of 
undesirable and unassimilable foreigners. All 
Americans in the Western States would then 
be satisfied. 

The most serious question upon the lips of 
both Japanese and Americans today is, "Will 
there be war between the United States and 



What Japan Wants in America 23 

Japan?" This question is not only discussed 
in the newspapers and by the people at large, 
but even thoughtful scholars and statesmen 
on both sides of the Pacific have written vol- 
umes regarding it. Some of these books 
have reached as high as the thirtieth edition 
within a single year. Yet people well in- 
formed regarding the conditions of both 
nations are inclined to believe that a war 
between two such countries is next to im- 
possible. 

Although during the past two centuries, 
men of science have invented many wonder- 
ful things, thus eliminating obstacles and put- 
ting into operation many marvelous devices, 
long believed impossible, still the geographi- 
cal distance between the two nations from 
the standpoint of war remains as insuscepti- 
ble to elimination as before. Two nations, 
thousands of miles apart, cannot war with 
each other to advantage. 

The United States and Japan are separated 
by 4,000 miles of watery waste. Doubtless, 



24 What Japan Wants in America 

military geniuses in both nations are able to 
devise scores of ways for occupying portions 
of the territory of the other; yet, at the same 
time they must admit that, because of the 
necessity of transporting supplies and ammu- 
nition across the ocean, there is not a single 
way by which they may maintain a military 
force, sufficient to enable them to utilize tem- 
porary victory in the country of the other. 
Therefore, to talk of war between the United 
States and Japan, both of which are so well 
protected and fortified, is comparable to the 
day dream of a young graduate of shortly 
becoming president of the United States. 

This remains true, however, only so long 
as both nations maintain large navies. Japan 
has discovered that it is financially impossible 
for her to keep pace with the United States 
in the building of battleships. This makes 
clear why she has recently begun to discuss a 
''holiday for the navy." At the same time, it 
explains why, notwithstanding the fact that 
limitation of armament has met with nation- 



What Japan Wants in America 25 

wide favor in Japan, she has hesitated to 
make a movement in that direction unless the 
United States would take a similar step. The 
limitation of both her own naval strength 
and that of the United States is one of the 
things that Japan wants more than anything 
else. 



WHAT JAPAN WANTS ON THE 
PACIFIC OCEAN 



26— 27— 28— 



CHAPTER II 

WHAT JAPAN WANTS ON THE 
PACIFIC OCEAN 

The Pacific Ocean, from the standpoint of 
both its size and political importance, is far- 
reaching. While bathing the shores of Can- 
ada, the United States, Mexico, and of nu- 
merous political units in both Central and 
South [America on the one side, its waters 
surge against the coasts of Siberia, Japan, 
Korea, China, and many other lands on the 
other, and encircle the thousands of islands, 
both great and small, that stud its bosom. 
Although the claiming of the Pacific by so 
many and so various peoples would seem to 
complicate matters, yet upon its broad ex- 
panse there is room for all. 

In the past, Japan and the United States 
have always assumed an attitude of com- 
promise with regard to any question of the 

Pacific. Of the many other lands washed 

2.9 



30 Japan and the Pacific Ocean 

by its waters, Hawaii, Mexico, Korea, and 
China are the countries looming largest in 
present-day controversies between Japan and 
the United States. One finds the history of 
the relations of these nations of great interest. 
As early as 1610, nearly two centuries 
before the United States had begun to rise 
as a nation, Japan sent an envoy to Mexico 
in a ship built in her own yards. When, 
however, in 1863, Napoleon III, in order to 
establish French influence in Mexico, set up 
Maximilian as emperor there, the country 
was saved through the influence of the United 
States. From that time until the present, 
American influence in Mexico has been on 
the increase. Prior to this, the United States 
had gradually extended toward Mexico terri- 
torially. Texas had been annexed, and sev- 
eral Western States carved out of what had 
once been Mexican territory. Today, none 
can deny that the United States holds para- 
mount sway in Mexico, both politically and 
industrially. 



Japan and the Pacific Ocean 31 



On the other hand, although the interna- 
tional relations between Japan and China 
may be traced back fifteen centuries, yet from 
the standpoint of modern international rela- 
tions, the United States entered into actual 
treaty relations with China several years 
earlier than did Japan. However, in the 
beginning of the 20th century, when Russia 
made repeated demands upon China for con- 
cessions, and China proved herself entirely 
powerless to resist, it was Japan that risked 
her national independence in a great war by 
which Russia was forced back and China 
saved. Prior to this, Japan had exerted great 
influence in Korea, then avowedly a depen- 
dency of China. Finally, Korea was annexed 
to Japan, and Japanese influence so extended 
into China that today Manchuria and Shan- 
tung are practically under her political con- 
trol. Today none can deny that Japan holds 
paramount sway in China, financially, politi- 
cally, and industrially. 

Explanation of this extension of territory 



32 Japan and the Pacific Ocean 



and influence on the part of both the United 
States and Japan is to be found in the fact 
that both of these nations grew strong while 
their neighbors to the south were in so un- 
settled a condition that they were unable to 
take care of themselves. Therefore, in dis- 
cussion of the question of the Pacific, one 
does well to bear in mind the similarity of 
the relationship of Mexico to the United 
States, to that of China to Japan. 

In 1881, King Kalakaua of Hawaii made 
a tour of the world and sojourned for some 
time in Japan. While there, he approached 
both the government and the Emperor of 
Japan with the request that Japanese be en- 
couraged to migrate to Hawaii. He realized 
that the Hawaiians were a dying race and 
believed that an influx of Japanese would 
rehabilitate the nation. In discussing the 
matter, he agreed to many conditions made 
by the Japanese Government, regarding the 
privileges and protection to be enjoyed in 
Hawaii by those Japanese who should elect 



Japan and the Pacific Ocean 33 



to go to live there. The Japanese found in 
Hawaii a veritable Paradise of the Pacific, 
and at the time of its annexation to the United 
States, the Japanese population of the islands 
outnumbered that of any other race, native 
Hawaiians not excepted. Nevertheless, the 
Japanese Government readily recognized the 
annexation. 

It was the United States that really intro- 
duced Occidental civilization into Korea. 
Yet, similarly, when Korea was annexed to 
Japan, notwithstanding the fact that many 
of the industrial interests in that peninsula, 
especially in mining and along electrical lines 
of work, were in the hands of Americans, the 
United States was practically the first nation 
to recognize the annexation by Japan and to 
recall her minister from Korea. 

History thus bears witness that in former 
times it has been the working policy of both 
Japan and the United States to solve ques- 
tions of the Pacific amicably and with mutual 
regard for the rights and interests of the 



34 Japan and the Pacific Ocean 

other. However, since the interests of the 
United States in the Philippines have become 
increasingly important on the one hand, and 
on the other, since the shipping on the Paci- 
fic has so largely fallen into the hands of 
Japan, especially since she demonstrated the 
strength of her marine power during the 
Great War by driving Germany from that 
ocean and taking upon herself the policing 
of the same, both Japan and the United States 
have taken a different attitude, and the con- 
trol of the Pacific Ocean has become a prob- 
lem among the nations. 

In fact, Japan has no intention of seeking 
to control the Pacific Ocean single-handed. 
She well knows that such would be impos- 
sible so long as strong marine powers like 
^reat Britain and. the United States exist. 
What she really wants is to have a fair share 
of the rights and privileges on the Pacific. 
Such being the case, the strong fortification 
by the United States of Hawaii, Guam, and 
the Philippines has caused her great misgiv- 



Japan and the Pacific Ocean 35 



ings. She can see no reason from her own 
standpoint for the fortification of these islands 
unless the United States regards Japan as a 
potential enemy. Therefore, with the excep- 
tion of a few militarists, the people of Japan 
are united in wanting all nations to remove 
all fortifications from their insular possessions 
on the Pacific, so that this ocean may become 
in reality what it is already in name, a truly 
"peaceful sea." 

In the 16th and 17th centuries, when Japan 
first came into contact with Occidental na- 
tions, such as Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, 
and Holland, she built ships in her own yards 
of sufficient size to compete successfully with 
those of Occidental nations. However, when 
she entered upon a period of complete seclu- 
sion in 1638, she became practically a ship- 
less Island Empire. Consequently, for many 
years after Japan was re-opened, most of the 
Japanese trade was conducted by foreigners 
living in Japan, and the major part of Jap- 
anese imports and exports were carried in 



36 Japan and the Pacific Ocean 

foreign bottoms. Ere long, both government 
and people came to realize the need of ships, 
and the government adopted the subsidy sys- 
tem to encourage the building of large mer- 
chant ships. The fruits of this policy were 
harvested in the Chino-Japan War. After 
the termination of the war, the subsidy system 
was extended. To it may be credited at least 
a part of the success in the war with Russia. 
As a result also, Japan today controls the 
shipping enterprise of the Pacific. There- 
fore Japan does not consider it any concern 
of hers whether any other nation subsidizes 
shipping. What she wants is the assurity 
that Japanese ships in foreign waters will 
have the same rights and privileges as are 
accorded foreign ships in Japanese waters. 
It is a well-known fact that Japan strongly 
desires to lay a cable across the Pacific in 
conjunction with the United States. There- 
fore, it is evident that with regard to trans- 
portation and communication, Japan wants 
the co-operation of the United States. 



Japan and the Pacific Ocean 37 



In discussing the question of the Pacific 
Ocean, one must not overlook the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance. Yet, it is a surprising 
fact that even prominent statesmen and pub- 
licists lack an understanding knowledge of 
this document. Consequently it may be in 
place here to devote brief space to a discus- 
sion of the three Anglo-Japanese treaties of 
Alliance. 

The first Alliance was entered into in 1902. 
It was prompted by two motives: 

1. The desire to check the aggression of 
Russia in the Far East. By the terms of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Great Britain and 
Japan covenanted to maintain the sovereignty 
and integrity of China and Korea. 

2. The desire of Great Britain to be en- 
abled to withdraw her naval force from 
Oriental waters and thus increase the number 
of ships at home. This was deemed advisable 
because of the aggressive naval policy of 
Germany. 

However, after Japan, abetted by the moral 



38 Japan and the Pacific Ocean 



support of Great Britain, had successfully 
prosecuted the war with Russia, she found 
it essential to make a protectorate of Korea. 
For this reason, before the expiration of the 
term of the first alliance, it became necessary 
to enter into a new alliance. This was done 
in 1905. Great Britain did not take this step 
without securing some advantage to herself. 
The most notable changes in the second treaty 
of alliance were: 

1. The striking out of the name of Korea. 

2. The writing in of the name of India, 
so that Japan should be responsible for cer- 
tain military service in case India should be 
attacked. 

The second and third treaties of alliance 
are practically the same. There is no par- 
ticular reason why the second alliance should 
have been renewed before its expiration, ex- 
cept that Japan desired to show a friendly 
attitude toward Great Britain and the United 
States. In 1911, when these nations were dis- 
cussing a treaty of general arbitration, Japan 



Japan and the Pacific Ocean 39 



perceived that one term of the Anglo-Japa- 
nese Alliance stood in the way of the suc- 
cessful conclusion of an Arbitration Treaty. 
Thereupon, she voluntarily approached Great 
Britain with the proposal that an additional 
article be incorporated in the treaty of Alli- 
ance: viz., that both Japan and Great Britain 
should be entirely free from obligation to 
render military assistance to the other in case 
either of them should engage in war with 
any nation with which the other had a treaty 
of arbitration. 

Since the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was 
first formed, many changes have taken place 
in world conditions, and the treaty has served 
purposes foreign to those of the original in- 
tent. Nevertheless, the motif of the first and 
second treaties was to curb the aggression of 
Russia. Though Russia was defeated in 1905, 
yet she has since changed the Siberian Rail- 
way from single to double track and had also 
undertaken a complete reorganization of her 
military forces. The truth of the latter is 



40 Japan and the Pacific Ocean 

fully attested by the complete surprise of 
the Germans at the unexpected preparedness 
and facility of mobilization of the Russian 
army in the beginning of the Great War. 

The three treaties of Anglo-Japanese Al- 
liance have been really beneficial both to 
China and to the peace of the Pacific. Al- 
though China is protesting at present against 
the formation of a new alliance, yet formerly 
she made no protest at the time of the signing 
of any of the three treaties of alliance. 
Through the alliance both Great Britain and 
Japan have enjoyed benefits. Japan's suc- 
cess in the war of 1905, through which she 
became a great power in the world, and also 
her ability to secure many concessions ia 
China may be largely attributed to her alli- 
ance with Great Britain. From 1914 on, 
throughout the duration of the Great War, 
Great Britain was able to feel easy, regarding 
the protection of her Eastern possessions. 
Moreover, she was able to rely upon Japanese 
naval power for the protection of her interests 



Japan and the Pacific Ocean 41 

in the Mediterranean. Her hands were thus 
freed for other work, and she was the better 
able to prosecute the war successfully. Still 
it is a great question today both in Great 
Britain and Japan whether it will be wise 
to renew the alliance. It rather seems as 
though, under changed world conditions, that 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has reached the 
end of its usefulness. Should it be renewed 
in its original form, it might arouse great 
suspicion in the United States as well as in 
other nations. If it should be renewed in the 
form that has been reported probable; that 
is, by removing all military features and mak- 
ing it a commercial alliance instead, it would 
flavor of a monopoly of the Pacific. Such 
a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
while failing to confer a single benefit upon 
the contracting powers, would be fraught 
with possible harm. Disturbance among 
English-speaking peoples might be created on 
the one hand, while on the other the un- 
friendly feeling between China and Japan 



42 Japan and the Pacific Ocean 



would doubtless be enhanced. Suspicions, 
boycotts, and lack of willingness to co- 
operate would be among the first fruits. It 
is hoped that this Alliance will be laid in 
an honorable grave at the Disarmament Con- 
ference at Washington. 

Today, the Japanese population in Hawaii 
practically predominates, as it constitutes 
nearly one-half of the total population of the 
islands. This has caused great anxiety on the 
part of many American statesmen for fear 
that the legislative power of Hawaii may 
some day fall into the hands of the Japanese, 
and that Japan may eventually come to con- 
trol the islands. Some Americans have gone 
so far as to state that, with this in view, 
Japan has actually sent ex-soldiers to the 
islands. Such report is groundless. What 
Japan wants with regard to the Japanese in 
the Hawaiian Islands is that her people be 
given perfect freedom either to return to 
Japan with their money and establish per- 
manent homes in Japan, or to remain in 



Japan and the Pacific Ocean 43 



Hawaii and become naturalized citizens of 
the United States. This is corroborated in 
that many Japanese who were not even born 
in Hawaii joined the United States forces 
during the Great War and later availed 
themselves of the privilege of naturalization. 
Therefore, if the United States Government 
should assume a proper attitude toward the 
Japanese within her boundaries, they would 
either return home or become an integral 
part of her population. 

Next to Hawaii, the Island of Yap looms 
large upon the horizon of controversy. Yap 
came under the mandate of the Japanese 
Government as a result of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, because Japan had rendered the 
utmost assistance to Great Britain during the 
war, in accordance with the stipulations of 
the alliance. Therefore when Japan received 
the first note from Secretary Hughes regard- 
ing this island, great excitement prevailed 
throughout the nation. Some prominent 
Japanese writers even went so far as to state 



44 Japan and the Pacific Ocean 

-<r — — ■ ' ~"~" ~~~~ 

that this was the first step toward the dis- 
integration of Japan's acquired territory. 
Consequently, most Japanese regarded the 
claim of the United States as exceedingly 
unjust and strongly protested that Japan's 
claim to Yap should be maintained at all 
hazards. However the ire of the people has 
been gradually assuaged as they have come 
to understand the peculiar situation of the 
Island of Yap relative to the Philippines. 
Such being the condition, what Japan wants 
with regard to the Island of Yap is that she 
may cede the cable line, in which the United 
States has a special interest because it runs 
to the Philippines, to the United States, and 
still retain the mandate of the island accord- 
ing to the terms of the Peace Treaty. 

Next comes a question widely discussed in 
America: viz., "Would Japan annex the 
Philippines in case the United States should 
grant those islands complete independence?" 
From a geographical standpoint this question 
is a very natural one, because, Formosa being 



Japan and the Pacific Ocean 45 



the connecting link, the Philippines seem to 
form a part of the long chain of islands con- 
stituting Japan. However, at the present 
time, Japan fosters no such ambition. As a 
matter of fact, before the Spanish-American 
War, Japan flatly refused to comply with a 
request of the Philippine Government to ren- 
der some military assistance. Furthermore, 
the Philippines offer no opening for Japanese 
emigrants. Because of the enervating cli- 
mate, those Japanese who have gone to the 
Philippines are constantly returning, and the 
Japanese population of the islands is stead- 
ily on the decrease. Therefore, what Japan 
wants in the Philippines is that, in the course 
of time, the Philippines may be granted 
independence, either complete or under the 
protectorate of the United States, and that 
Japan may be able to enjoy unhampered 
trade with them. As a matter of fact, in the 
16th and 17th centuries, the Philippines con- 
stituted one of the two main sources of 



46 Japan and the Pacific Ocean 



Japan's foreign trade; the other being New 
Spain. 

In conclusion, let us restate what Japan 
wants with regard to the control of the Pa- 
cific. She desires to make some arrangement 
with the United States, whereby each nation 
shall so limit the strength of her own navy 
as to maintain only sufficient sea-power for 
defensive purposes, thus leaving the entire 
ocean open to the interests of all nations. In 
other words, Japan would extend the Open 
Door policy to the Pacific. 



.WHAT JAPAN WANTS IN CHINA 



47—48 



CHAPTER III 

WHAT JAPAN WANTS IN CHINA 

The United States has a right to claim to 
have been, whether intentionally or not, the 
benefactor of Oriental nations. It was she 
who introduced Japan to the world. Fur- 
thermore, the United States is the only great 
Occidental power that has no territorial pos- 
sessions in China. On every possible occa- 
sion, she has extended to China a helping 
hand. However, prior to 1905 when the 
Russo-Japan War came to a close, the United 
States had shown warmer friendship for 
Japan than for China. With the completion 
of the transcontinental railroad in the Unit- 
ed States, which was accomplished largely 
through the employment of Chinese laborers, 
the Chinese became an element of industrial 
disturbance on the Pacific Coast. "The Chi- 
nese Must Go" became a common slogan, 

49 



50 What Japan Wants in China 

and sand-lot speakers drew large crowds. 
This agitation culminated in the enactment 
of the Geary Exclusion Law in 1882. 

About this time the Japanese began coming 
to the United States. They were received 
with open arms and constituted a species of 
pet Orientals. Therefore when the war be- 
tween China and Japan broke out in 1894, 
American sympathy was with Japan. How- 
ever, through the Chino-Japan War and the 
Spanish-American War, Japan and the United 
States both came to rank as world powers. 
Yet for many years they did not come into 
conflict on any question. The United States 
practically looked upon the rise of Japan as 
the result of American influence in that coun- 
try through the introduction of Occidental 
civilization. Even as late as 1904, when 
Japan was meditating war with Russia, the 
United States was undeniably on the side of 
Japan, for she went to the extent of joining 
with Great Britain in a protest to Russia con- 
cerning her aggressive policy in the Orient. 



What Japan Wants in China 51 



Moreover, during the progress of the war, 
the United States afforded moral as well as 
financial support to Japan, 
i However, the victorious ending of the 
war for Japan proved to be the turning-point 
in the relationships between Japan and the 
United States with regard to many points, 
the Far Eastern question in particular. The 
rapid increase of the Japanese population in 
the United States and the steady extension of 
Japanese influence in the Orient on the one 
hand, and on the other, the helplessness of 
China as a nation and the gradual decrease 
of the Chinese population in the United 
States have caused the United States to assume 
a different attitude toward Japan. Although 
both Japan and the United States are re- 
garded as great world powers, yet it must be 
borne in mind that the United States is a 
power of mature years while Japan is merely 
an adolescent. In consequence, one cannot 
fairly judge of the conduct of Japan as a 
great nation by the same standards as those 



52 What Japan Wants in China 



that may be rightly applied to the United 
States. Irregularities frequently occur when 
either nations or individuals rise to promi- 
nence within a limited time. Therefore it 
is not to be wondered at that Japan regards 
the annexation of Korea as comparable to 
the annexation of Texas by the United States. 
Neither is she able to differentiate between 
her succession to the concessions of Germany 
in Shantung and the succession of the United 
States to the French concessions in Panama. 
China's refusal to sign the decision of the 
Peace Conference regarding the disposition 
of Shantung is, to the Japanese mind, com- 
parable to the refusal of Colombia to enter 
into treaty relations with the United States 
because of her dissatisfaction regarding the 
Panama deal. 

When one lauds China as a peace-loving 
nation because her representative, Wellington 
Koo, so readily approved the policy of dis- 
armament at the conference of the League of 
Nations, he must at the same time remember 



What Japan Wants in China 53 



that her soldiers have mutinied again and 
again in such important cities as Ichang, 
Hankow, and Wuchang, where they have 
looted foreign enterprises as well as destroy- 
ing Chinese property. This fact proves that 
China today is in no position to take the 
lead in a movement for disarmament. It 
would behoove her rather to inquire of other 
nations as to the best method of disarming 
her mutinous soldiery. China has a million 
fighting men to whom she owes several 
months of back pay. 

When the decision on the Shantung ques- 
tion was made public, a number of United 
States senators and other statesmen of promi- 
nence voiced unqualified denunciation, stating 
that by that decision several millions of Chi- 
nese had been made the slaves of Japan and 
that several hundred miles of Chinese terri- 
tory had been placed under Japanese control, 
while in fact, the district in dispute comprises 
but a few hundred square miles and is in- 
habited by not more than twenty to thirty 



54 What Japan Wants in China 

thousand Chinese. Things Oriental are in- 
deed difficult for Occidentals to understand. 
In order to discuss Oriental questions intelli- 
gently, statesmen and diplomats stand in need 
of a clearer background of historical knowl- 
edge and present-day facts regarding the 
nations of the Far East. 

The Open Door policy, formulated by 
Secretary Hay, is not only of great import 
in the Orient, but like the Monroe Doctrine 
in the Western Hemisphere, this policy has 
created prestige for the United States in the 
Orient. However, after the Open Door 
policy had been fully recognized by all na- 
tions, it became the subject of much criticism 
and discussion. Charges were made that the 
Open Door policy was not functioning in 
accordance with the original intent. Deflec- 
tions may be attributed, first, to the fact that 
the policy had no strong military backing; 
and second, to the circumstance that, while 
displaying great wisdom in formulating the 
policy, Secretary Hay failed to demand that 



What Japan Wants in China 55 



all nations abandon their spheres of influence 
in China. Furthermore, in apparent contra- 
diction to the spirit of the Open Door policy, 
by the terms of the Ishii-Lansing agreement, 
the United States herself has gone so far as 
to recognize the special interests of Japan 
in China. 

Let us now endeavor to view the Open 
Door policy from the standpoint of China. 
What ground is there to assume that China 
will not rise again to the former state of 
prosperity and glory attained by her at va- 
rious times, notably in the Tang and Sung 
dynasties, and again enjoyed for a century 
or more even under the rule of the Manchus? 
If China should thus rise once more, the 
discussion of the Open Door policy in China 
would be comparable to a discussion by Euro- 
pean nations of an Open Door policy in the 
United States or in Japan. Therefore, the 
time may not be far distant when this policy, 
like the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, shall have 
outlived its usefulness. This suggests an- 



56 What Japan Wants in China 



other thing that Japan wants: viz., to know 
why China is objecting so strongly to a re- 
newal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in 
which the integrity and sovereignty of China 
are guaranteed, the objections being made 
on the ground that the affairs of an inde- 
pendent nation are not open to discussion by 
other nations, while at the same time, she 
raises no voice against the Open Door policy, 
which would appear to be even more meddle- 
some. What Japan wants today with regard 
to the Open Door policy, is that it be main- 
tained with the assurance that each nation 
may retain undisturbed control of interests 
already acquired in China. Furthermore, 
she desires that the United States, Japan, and 
Great Britain unite in helping China finan- 
cially and politically. 

Japan's attitude toward China, especially 
since the Chino-Japan War, is one of marked 
contrast to that maintained by her for a thou- 
sand years, prior to the middle of the 19th 
century. Great respect and fear have been 



What Japan Wants in China 57 



replaced by contempt and scorn. Moreover, 
China, discarding her former attitude of self- 
sufficiency has recognized the advantageous 
situation of Japan in the Orient. Year after 
year, she has sent thousands of students to 
Japan to be educated in Japanese schools. 
She has also invited both Japanese statesmen 
and scholars to aid in the reorganization of 
both her educational and governmental sys- 
tems. 

In this connection, Japan has made a seri- 
ous mistake. That is, Japan has come to 
believe that China can be saved only by de- 
pending upon her. She has placed herself 
high above China and has reached down a 
hand which she has commanded China to 
humbly grasp if she would keep her head 
above water. However, China, though 
greatly weakened, still priding herself upon 
being a nation with four thousand years of 
history and tradition behind her, has chosen 
rather to sink by herself than to float under 
the lead of Japan. Because of this attitude 



58 What Japan Wants in China 

of Japan, most of the Chinese students, edu- 
cated in that country, upon returning home, 
have not only failed to show friendship for 
Japan, but on the contrary have often become 
ring-leaders in movements unfriendly to 
Japan, such, for instance, as the boycott of 
Japanese goods. Consequently, Japan has 
come to regard the Chinese as a most un- 
grateful people. Yet, little by little, she is 
making the discovery that Chinese educated 
in the United States, Great Britain, and other 
foreign countries, are almost without excep- 
tion, upon their return to the homeland, loyal 
friends and advocates of the country in which 
they were educated. Finally, she is begin- 
ning to realize that there is something amiss 
in her manner of dealing with the Chinese 
people. The need of China's good will was 
strongly emphasized during the war by the 
discovery that the success of Japan's indus- 
tries was, to a considerable degree, dependent 
upon her ability to obtain raw material from 
China. Today, there is a nation-wide move- 



What Japan Wants in China 59 



ment in Japan for the promotion of har- 
monious relationships with China. This is 
illustrated by the resolutions recently adopted 
by the entire student bodies of the two lead- 
ing universities in Japan, requesting the Japa- 
nese Government to use the Boxer Fund for 
the purpose of supporting Chinese students 
in Japanese institutions of learning; and fur- 
ther, by the fact that prominent Japanese 
statesmen and business men are constantly 
crossing the water to China to interview lead- 
ing men in that but recently despised country. 
Japan has at last come to a sober realization 
that friendship is not to be attained through 
condescension, but that friends must grasp 
hands on the same level. However, this new 
and sane attitude bears fruit but slowly, be- 
cause China, harking back to her long expe- 
rience with Japanese diplomacy, regards this 
move in the light of the invitation of the 
Spider to the Fly. This accounts for the 
repeated refusal of China to enter into 



60 What Japan Wants in China 

negotiations with Japan for the return of 
Shantung. 

When compared with that of Occidental 
nations, the position of Japan in China is 
significant. Because of her propinquity, she 
enjoys tremendous geographical advantages. 
Such being the case, even the boycott of Japa- 
nese goods by the Chinese did not produce 
expected results. This may be largely at- 
tributed to the low economic standard of 
China, which made it prohibitive for her 
people to buy goods from Occidental nations, 
manufactured by high paid workmen and 
transported long distances. The infant stage 
of China's industrial work also affected the 
success of the boycott. Furthermore, the 
foundations of Japanese trade in China, so 
strongly laid during the Russo-Japan War 
when the Chinese showed great sympathy for 
Japan on the one hand, while on the other 
they established a nation-wide boycott against 
the United States because of her treatment 
of Chinese in this country, could not be en- 



What Japan Wants in China 61 



tirely overthrown. Therefore, notwithstand- 
ing the general boycott against Japan, the 
Chinese found it necessary to buy considera- 
ble quantities of Japanese goods. One of the 
things that Japan wants in China is to be 
able to utilize her geographical situation and 
her influence already acquired in that coun- 
try, to the best advantage. 

The concessions held by Japan in China 
are of three kinds : The first concessions were 
obtained as a result of the Chino-Japan War. 
By them, persons of other nationalities were 
permitted to navigate the rivers of China and 
to establish industrial plants within the con- 
fines of her territory. As this concession ex- 
tended these privileges to persons of all 
nationalities, it was of benefit to the world 
at large as well as to Japan. 

The second concessions were obtained as a 
result of the Russo-Japan War, when Japan 
stepped into the shoes vacated by Russia. By 
these concessions, special rights were granted 
to Japan alone, that were not thrown open 



62 What Japan Wants in China 



to other nations. As a result, Japan made 
great national expansion by obtaining terri- 
torial leases and special mining and railroad 
concessions. Out of these concessions, sprang 
the ill-will of China for Japan. 

The third class of concessions consisted in 
the succession of Japan to the German con- 
cessions in Shantung, during the Great War. 
They were followed by the famous Twenty- 
one Demands, by means of which Japan 
gained further political and industrial con- 
cessions. This brought the enmity of China 
to a high pitch. 

Today, Japan wants to retain all these con- 
cessions in their commercial and industrial 
aspects only, and to separate them from mili- 
tary and political influence. 

Japan's policy regarding Shantung is to 
return the political control of the peninsula 
to China and to retain only the mining, rail- 
road, and industrial concessions which China 
conceded to her under the Twenty-one De- 
mands of 1915. China hesitates to enter into 



What Japan Wants in China 63 



direct negotiations with Japan on this sub- 
ject without the mediation of a third power. 
However, from present tendencies, it looks 
as though this question may be settled before 
the convening of the Disarmament Confer- 
ence in Washington on November 11th of 
the present year. 

Taking up the question of the Japanese 
loans to China, we find that some loans have 
been made by the government, some by bank- 
ing houses, and others by private corpora- 
tions. The purpose of these loans was to 
enable the Chinese Government to build rail- 
roads and to develop mining and industrial 
work. Some of the loans have certain secu- 
rity, such as the customs tariff, the monopoly 
of the salt industry, and the control of the 
taxes of certain districts, while others, such 
as the Nishihara loan, were made without 
security. Portions of these loans have been 
used for purposes other than those stipulated. 
Therefore, on certain loans China is not only 
unable to pay the interest, but from her finan- 



64 What Japan Wants in China 

cial outlook, Japan has come to fear the total 
loss of both interest and principal. This is 
the reason why, notwithstanding the fact that 
Japan at first hesitated to join the Consor- 
tium, she eventually joined with the United 
States, Great Britain and France to further 
finance China in order to again set her on 
her feet. 

The final question of importance is whether 
Japan would prefer to have China divided 
or to remain a united nation. Americans 
returning from China express widely varying 
opinions as to what Japan wants on this sub- 
ject. Some state that Japan wants to see 
China divided so that she will be greatly 
weakened, while others hold that Japan wants 
to have China remain intact, so that she may 
eventually control the whole. No reliance 
can be placed in the opinions of the majority 
of Occidentals coming from the Orient. The 
opinions of many reflect their personal inter- 
ests, while others are the product of pure 
ima.^ination devoid of foundation in fact. 



What Japan Wants in China 65 



The larger percentage of Occidentals who 
live in China and Japan live there in a man- 
ner quite different from the way they would 
live at home. The truth of this is attested 
by the large numbers of Eurasian children 
in those countries without legal fathers.^ 
Such being the state of affairs, but little 
weight may be attached to the opinions of 
many returning from the Orient. Most of 
these neither read nor speak Chinese to any 
extent, and because of their character are 
barred from social circles where trustworthy 
information might be obtained. 

What Japan really wants is a united China, 
strong politically, financially, and industri- 
ally. She wants this not because she has any 
particular love for China, but for her own 
benefit. If the whole of China were ruled 

^ In Japan, the loose life of Occidentals reached its 
climax just before the outbreak of the Chino-Japan War, 
when one extreme offender was driven from Japan. As 
his unnatural crime was committed prior to 1899, when, 
at the instance of Great Britain, the extraterritorial rights 
and jurisdiction were returned to Japan by all nations, 
Japan was at the time unable to bring the Occidental 
before her courts. 



66 What Japan Wants in China 

by a single, responsible government, in case 
of any movement against Japan such as a 
boycott, Japan would be able to approach 
the government and effect a conciliation. 
This desire is strengthened by Japan's new- 
born ambition to establish a firm friendship 
with China, in the hope that the two nations 
will stand together in the future for the wel- 
fare of the Orient. 



WHAT JAPAN WANTS IN KOREA 



67 68 



CHAPTER IV. 

WHAT JAPAN WANTS IN KOREA 

International relations between Japan and 
Korea had their beginning in a time so re- 
mote that their origin cannot be traced. Al- 
though today, Japan is the intellectual leader 
of Korea, yet in ancient times, her own civ- 
ilization was developed by Koreans. Korean 
influence in Japan was fell as early as the 
4th century A.D. and was greatly augmented 
after the introduction of Buddhism in 552, 
through the medium of Korea. In fact, up 
to the end of the 7th century, the industrial 
and intellectual development of Japan was 
entirely in the hands of Koreans. However, 
early in the 8th century, Korean influence 
began to decline and Korea became rather a 
political dependent of China than the intel- 
lectual leader of Japan. 

Toward the end of the 16th century, Japan 

69 



70 What Japan Wants in Korea 

sought to invade China. Just as in 1914 
Kaiser Wilhelm demanded a road through 
Belgium, in 1592 the Japanese demanded a 
road through Korea to China. This the 
Korean king bravely and resolutely refused 
to grant. Thereupon Korea became the 
battleground of the three nations, with Japan 
ranged against the allied forces of China and 
Korea. During the seven years of bloody 
warfare that ensued, Korean industries and 
arts were entirely wiped out. All movable 
products of Korean civilization were carried 
to Japan, and even Korean artists and arti- 
sans were forcibly transported thither and 
compelled to ply their trades in the enemy 
country. How history has repeated itself in 
this 20th century in a little European na- 
tion! Belgian civilization has, however, sur- 
vived the shock, but Korea has never shone 
again in her former splendor. The war in 
Korea was abruptly terminated by the sud- 
den death from illness of the leader of the 
Japanese forces. 



What Japan Wants in Korea 71 

In the beginning of the 17th century, 
Japan, finding herself isolated, begged in 
humble terms that Korea would make peace 
with her. In her letter of request, she not 
only recognized Korea as a dependency of 
China, but China as the supreme power of 
the Orient. In the middle of the 19th cen- 
tury, China began to disintegrate and to lose 
one after another of her dependencies. Tak- 
ing advantage of this, in 1876, Japan forced 
Korea to conclude a treaty of peace and am- 
ity with her by the terms of which Korea 
was compelled to declare herself an inde- 
pendent kingdom. This was the entering 
wedge of Japan's political influence in Korea, 
which country was later made a Japanese 
dependency and finally annexed. 

The Korean protectorate, the abdication 
of the Korean Emperor, the annexation, and 
many other changes were brought about 
mainly through the strong military influence 
of Japan, although for appearance sake, most 
of these things were carried out by the volun- 



72 What Japan Wants in Korea 

tary action of the Koreans. However, Japan 
was fully cognizant of Korea's dissatisfaction 
on the one hand, while on the other, she 
knew the power of her own military backing. 
Such being the case, since the annexation, the 
Governor of Korea has been appointed either 
from among the generals of the army or the 
admirals of the navy. Although the Korean 
government is civilian in form, yet the whole 
control is in the hands of military men. 
Hence the Japanese government in Korea, 
to state it mildly, has at least a twofold 
aspect. 

Now in order to gain a better understand- 
ing of Korean affairs, let us consider them 
in some detail since the annexation. It is 
true that the Koreans did not to any appre- 
ciable degree oppose the annexation of their 
country to Japan in 1910. Even the ruling 
class remained quiet with the exception of 
a very few patriots who raised a feeble cry 
at the loss of national independence. The 
reason why such an old nation as Korea with 



What Japan Wants in Korea 73 



a history of more than 3,000 years was so 
peacefully annexed is that the old Korean 
administration had become hopelessly de- 
generate and that the people were suffering 
in an extreme degree. Therefore on the day 
of annexation, the Korean people were recon- 
ciled to the new regime. Their position at 
that time being so miserable and so hopeless, 
they felt confident that no nation could pos- 
sibly give them a worse government than 
the one they were enduring. The Japanese 
came to Korea with flattering promises. Dur- 
ing the decade that has since elapsed, Japan 
has given Korea an incomparably better ad- 
ministration. She has introduced all sorts 
of modern improvements, and has thus made 
it possible for the ill-fed and ill-clothed 
Koreans to enjoy the comforts of modern 
civilization. They not only have better 
houses to live in, but numbers of Koreans 
have been able to start savings accounts in 
the banks. Under the old regime, this lat- 
ter was almost impossible, because if it 



74 What Japan Wants in Korea 



became known that a man had money, Ko- 
rean officials under one pretext or another 
would extract it from him. If he refused 
to reveal its hiding-place, they would either 
throw him into prison or take his life. That 
marvelous improvement has been made is 
attested by the fact that foreign residents in 
Korea are perfectly satisfied to live under 
Japanese jurisdiction. 

At the same time, the Japanese have been 
making a very serious mistake with regard 
to innovations. They have tried to force 
every sort of thing down the throats of the 
Koreans, whether it was palatable or not. 
For instance, an attempt has been made to 
substitute the Japanese language for the na- 
tive tongue. A nation with a history and 
civilization of its own of so many thousands 
of years' standing, certainly has treasured 
traditions, customs and usages. No matter 
to what state of degeneracy Korea may have 
been reduced at the time of the annexation, 
this attempt at radical change is certainly a 



What Japan Wants in Korea 75 



great national insult, particularly when it is 
remembered that in ancient times Korea was 
the successful tutor of Japan. Worse than 
this, after the annexation, educated Japanese 
flocked to Korea and were appointed to al- 
most all government places of note. Then 
Japanese merchants, artisans and farmers fol- 
lowed. By utilizing their financial and in- 
tellectual power, together with their superior 
manual skill, these immigrants, under the 
strong protection of the military power of 
Japan, gradually encroached along all lines 
of Korean life and industry. Furthermore, 
as the government conducts everything in a 
military way, any Korean offering opposition 
is punished in accordance with military regu- 
lations. 

Self-respecting and intelligent Koreans 
have therefore found it very trying to live 
in their own country. It is a sad fact that 
since the annexation more than half a mil- 
lion Koreans have crossed the border into 
Manchuria and Siberia, on the bleak wastes 



76 What Japan Wants in Korea 



of which they have sought to found new 
homes. In government circles, race distinc- 
tion is marked, even with regard to friendly 
Koreans. Certain government positions are 
legally open to Koreans. However, should 
a Korean and a Japanese who have graduated 
from the same school be appointed to a cer- 
tain kind of position at the same time, the 
promotion of the Korean will be exceedingly 
slow, and after a few years, his position will 
be both far inferior and less remunerative 
than that of his Japanese classmate. Thus 
do Koreans suffer injustice in their own 
country because they are Koreans. This sort 
of thing is increasing year by year, and the 
Japanese administration is becoming more 
and more militaristic. Koreans have abso- 
lutely no means of making their dissatisfac- 
tion known to the world outside because they 
have neither freedom of speech nor of the 
press. They are forced to live in isolation 
and under oppression in their own country. 
However, the Koreans have not been left 



What Japan Wants in Korea 77 



entirely without comforters to whom they 
may confidently look for sympathy and aid. 
Although Korea was the country that intro- 
duced both Confucianism and Buddhism into 
Japan in ancient times, she herself became 
in the course of time a nation without 
religion. Many centuries before Japanese 
influence was felt in Korea, Buddhist priests 
had been strictly prohibited from entering 
the Korean capital. In fact, nowhere else 
in the world could there be found another 
field so well-cleared and prepared to receive 
the seed of Christianity as was that of Korea 
when the Christian missionaries began their 
work there. Ere long, the religion of Jesus 
Christ took a strong hold on the hearts of 
the people. Under the old Korean govern- 
ment regime when corrupt Korean officials 
perpetrated any injustice upon Christian con- 
verts, the missionaries always showed their 
hand. Not only were they able to obtain 
justice for the oppressed but they frequently 
caused offending officials to be reprimanded. 



78 What Japan Wants in Korea 



The missionaries were able to do this because 
justice was on their side and also because 
behind them they had the power of a strong 
home government. Christian missionaries in 
Korea were therefore in a position to take 
this unusual course and to show the people 
that they as missionaries had power over 
even the Korean officials. After the annexa- 
tion, the position of the missionaries was en- 
tirely changed. They had to obey the Japa- 
nese law; they had to be satisfied to place 
their lives and their property under Japanese 
jurisdiction; and even their educational in- 
stitutions, supported by mission boards, had 
to be reorganized, in order to conform with 
the Japanese educational code. In all these 
ways they lost prestige and influence. There- 
fore, it is very natural that Christian mis- 
sionaries should be able to sympathize with 
the Koreans in their present unfortunate cir- 
cumstances, because they themselves have felt 
the weight of the strong hand of Japan. 
Quite a number of young Koreans, edu- 



5Vhat Japan Wants in Korea 79 



cated in Japan and in the United States, have 
been returning to their native land. Upon 
seeing the helpless condition of their com- 
patriots, they have not been able to refrain 
from opposition to the Japanese administra- 
tion. As a result of the Great War, self- 
determination for all peoples became exten- 
sively advocated. When Korea heard of the 
creation of Poland and of the state of the 
Jugo-Slavs, w^hose peoples had long been 
under the rule of other nations, and when 
rumors came of revolts in India, Egypt, and 
Ireland, the Korean people felt the time 
opportune to throw off the yoke of Japan. 
The Korean uprising of March, 1919, re- 
sulted. 'At the time of this outbreak, the 
Japanese Government made a second most 
serious mistake. Although termed a revolt, 
the Korean outbreak of 1919 was extremely 
unique in character. Among all revolts re- 
corded in history, it has no duplicate. It 
was a most harmless and peaceable uprising 
because the Koreans had no military weapons. 



80 What Japan Wants in Korea 



During the period of ten years that had inter- 
vened since the annexation, the Japanese had 
been assiduous in confiscating military weap- 
ons of every description. Consequently, at 
the time of the uprising, the Koreans had 
nothing with which to fight, except stones 
and canes. Although tens of thousands of 
men joined the uprising in various districts, 
still very few were earnestly fighting for the 
cause of independence. Most of them merely 
followed on because they were unhappy. The 
standard of intelligence in Korea being ex- 
ceedingly low, most of the people are easily 
induced to join any cause. Furthermore, the 
Koreans are very credulous. During the 
period of the uprising, numbers of people 
gazed anxiously at the sky, expecting at any 
moment to see President Wilson descending 
in an airplane to render them aid. Some of 
the more thoughtful of the watchers displayed 
large white flags so that the Chief Executive 
of the United States might readily discern 
where to land. This class of people consti- 



What Japan Wants in Korea 81 



luted the bulk of those who rose against the 
Japanese administration. Therefore, had the 
Japanese Government adopted a more gentle 
and beneficent policy, the people would have 
been pacified without serious consequence. 
Instead, the Japanese military administration 
sent thousands of well-trained soldiers car- 
rying up-to-date military weapons to fight 
against this child-like, practically harmless 
mob. Villages were attacked, and several 
thousand Korean men, women, and children 
were either killed or wounded. 

This Korean uprising was, however, not 
wholly without result, for through it, the 
question of the administration of Korea be- 
gan to engage the attention of the home 
government in Japan as well as that of the 
world at large. Today many leading Japa- 
nese want to have the government of Korea 
changed from a military to a purely civil 
administration. Some prominent political 
leaders even go so far as to advocate that 
self-government be permitted to Korea. Since 



82 What Japan Wants in Korea 

the uprising, the educational system has been 
greatly improved and at present the Japa- 
nese Government is planning to establish a 
university in Korea for the education of 
Koreans. 

During the ten years of Japanese Govern- 
ment in Korea, Japan has shown her hand 
along many lines, particularly in agriculture 
and in fishing. Notable also are the intro- 
duction of sheep raising and the planting of 
cotton. Japan w^ants to make of Korea a 
place for the production of raw material 
to supply the industries of Japan. There is, 
however, one thing that Japan would like to 
do in Korea but cannot; that is to mine exten- 
sively for gold. She is hampered in this by 
the fact that some time before she obtained 
a foothold in Korea, American corporations 
had secured control of most of the principal 
gold mines in that country. Though the 
Japanese are working a number of smaller 
mines, yet the total annual output does not 



What Japan Wants in Korea 83 



compare with that of those under American 

control. 

One of the things that Japan wants most 
in Korea today is to effect a fusion of the 
two races. In order to set an example, a 
Japanese princess of Imperial blood was 
recently married to the former Crown Prince 
of Korea. At present, Japan is also revising 
a law in order to facilitate marriage between 
Japanese and Koreans. If the proper steps 
are taken, Japan bids fair to succeed along 
this line. The fusion is the more likely 
because the Korean language is the only 
tongue that is closely related to the Japanese^ 
Furthermore, anthropologists are well-nigh 
agreed that the two races sprang from the 
same original stock. 

What the future holds in store for Korea 
is hard to foretell. One thing, however, 
seems certain. The complete independence 
of Korea is practically out of the question. 
Korean history of 3,000 years furnishes the 
basis for this conclusion. Throughout the 



84 What Japan Wants in Korea 

long period of her existence, Korea has never, 
for any length of time, been able to stand 
alone; but has been either a dependency of 
Japan or of China. Moreover, because of 
her geographical situation, Japan cannot 
grant Korea independent self-government, 
because, as can be readily seen by the map, 
Korea is strategically of much greater im- 
portance to Japan than is Cuba to the United 
States. One able writer has aptly termed 
her "an arrow pointed at the heart of Japan." 
Therefore, should this weak nation, after 
having become independent, fall prey to a 
stronger power, the fate of Japan would be 
sealed. 

Although it may sound rather illogical, 
the most sane solution of the Korean problem 
would be restoration of the Korean dynasty 
to the throne under the strong protectorate 
of Japan. In one way or another, Japan not 
only wants but is determined to keep Korea 
under her political control. 



WHAT JAPAN WANTS IN SIBERIA 



85—86 



CHAPTER V 

WHAT JAPAN WANTS IN SIBERIA 

If America is the white man's land, Japan 
would inquire whether Siberia is not the 
yellow man's land. Though Siberia today 
constitutes a part of the Russian Empire, yet 
in order to decide whether Siberia is politi- 
cally a component part of Russia, one must 
turn to history. ' In the 19th century, when 
China became engaged in wars with France 
and Great Britain, Russia played the part of 
a skilful diplomatic broker. As a reward 
for her good offices, she managed to obtain 
for herself one slice after another of choice 
Chinese territory. Later, she made bold to 
send expeditions further north into Siberia, 
and finally succeeded in bringing the whole 
of this great barren waste peopled by Asiatic 
tribes, under her control. She even occupied 

87 



88 What Japan Wants in Siberia 

Sakhalin, the northernmost of the islands of 
Japan. 

With the downfall of the Russian Empire, 
history nimbly retraced her steps. Japan has 
reoccupied the whole of Sakhalin Island and 
has assumed military control both of Vladi- 
vostok and an immense region round about 
Now that the doors of all Anglo-Saxon na- 
tions are closed against her emigrants and 
she must seek some other outlet for her 
population, it is but natural that Japan should 
raise the question whether Siberia may not 
be the land of the yellow man. 

Before the Great War, Vladivostok was 
one of the three most important military 
ports on the Asiatic Coast, the others being 
Kiao-chao and Port Arthur. At present, it 
is one of the most isolated spots on earth. It 
is nearly 5,000 miles distant from America, 
across the Pacific; and under present condi- 
tions, it cannot be reached from Europe via 
the Siberian Railroad. Yet Vladivostok holds 
the distinction of being today the only quiet, 



What Japan Wants in Siberia 89- 



peaceful spot in the entire Empire of the 
late, unfortunate Czar. Though uprisings 
have occurred several times, whether justi- 
fiable or no, they have each time been 
promptly quelled and the participants therein 
disarmed by the Japanese troops. 

Since the downfall of the Russian Em- 
pire, Japan has spent more than one billion 
yen without benefit to herself because of 
Siberia. Because of this, and for other rea- 
sons, she has finally decided to withdraw her 
army. After the troops have been recalled 
and peace has been permanently restored in 
Siberia, Japan wants to make of Vladivostok 
an open port similar to Hongkong. Then 
in course of time, Vladivostok would become 
a port through which Japan could establish 
the shortest possible trade route to Europe. 
Japan feels that the right to establish such 
a trade route is the smallest reward that she 
could possibly ask in return for her financial 
and military efforts. 

However, the Japanese are very much 



90 What Japan Wants in Siberia 

opposed to the thought of having a Bolshevist 
government as a neighbor, because this would 
bring great national trouble. Even today, 
Bolshevism has already penetrated into Japan 
and to a limited extent, both men and women 
have become infected with the doctrines of 
the Reds. In order to avoid closer proxim- 
ity, Japan wants to have some independent 
state established between herself and Bol- 
shevik Russia. This explains why Japan 
wants all nations to recognize the Far East 
Republic at Chita in Siberia. She has al- 
ready sent her representatives to the Chita 
Government and has entered into negotiations 
with it regarding numerous concessions in 
Siberia along the lines of mining, fishing, and 
industry. Of course, Japan also wants elbow 
room in Siberia for her surplus population. 
However, the sending of emigrants either 
to Siberia or to other countries is not a press- 
ing question with the government just now. 
Notwithstanding that Japan is one of the 
most densely populated nations in the world, 



What Japan ^Vants in Siberia 91 



yet this density is not so menacing that the 
nation cannot maintain its population without 
.seeking an outlet elsewhere. Besides, Japan 
is today meeting the situation in two ways. 
First, the nation is rapidly changing from 
an agricultural to an industrial country. This 
is evidenced by the fact that the great indus- 
trial cities, such as Osaka, Nagoya, and Kobe 
have increased their population one hundred 
per cent in the last decade, the main source 
of supply having been from the country dis- 
tricts. Second, although far from making 
such practice legal, the Japanese Government 
has tacitly acquiesced in methods of birth 
control. This is evidenced by the fact that 
most of the leading magazines published in 
Japan contain numerous advertisements along 
these lines. Yet, the government shows no 
hand. Therefore, though Japan wants some 
space on the Asiatic Continent for future 
expansion, for the present, at least, she is 
able to cope with the problem of population. 
!A. more vital question is where she will 



92 What Japan Wants in Siberia 

be able to obtain a constant supply of raw 
materials for her rapidly-growing industries. 
Manufacturing is fast becoming in Japan, as 
it has long been in England, the mainstay of 
the nation. Because the natural resources of 
Japan are very limited, what Japan wants 
most is assurance of permanent sources of 
supply of raw material. China is, of course, 
an inexhaustible mine, but at the same time 
this mine is being worked by all nations and 
even China herself, with her millions of 
laborers, is beginning to manufacture on an 
unprecedented scale. Siberia, on the other 
hand, is both thinly populated and practically 
unexploited. Moreover, this vast country lies 
just across the Sea of Japan and from its 
geographical propinquity would seem to be 
the natural source of raw material. 

Therefore, although war between Japan 
and the United States, according to the pres- 
ent outlook, seems well-nigh impossible, still 
none can say with assurity that permanent 
peace can long be maintained between the 



What Japan Wants in Siberia 93 

two nations. However, if war should come, 
the cause thereof will not be the Japanese 
question in the United States, but rather with 
regard to some situation in the Orient itself. 
Japan might take up arms should the United 
States adopt some policy that would stand 
in the way of Japan in obtaining raw mate- 
rials from China or Siberia. Interference 
of this sort would threaten not only the 
sources of the national prosperity of Japan, 
but even her very existence. 

What Japan wants to do in Siberia at pres- 
ent is first to develop the natural resources 
of that country and utilize them in supplying 
material for Japanese industries, and later, 
perhaps, to send immigrants thither. Finally, 
Japan wants to make of the Sea of Japan 
a Japanese inland sea, just as the ancient 
Romans made a Roman sea of the Mediter- 
ranean in the time of the Roman Empire. 
From a Japanese standpoint, such an under- 
taking is a natural one. The Sea of Japan 
is closed on the south by a very narrow chan- 



94 What Japan Wants in Sibeiia 

nel known as the Straits of Korea, which is 
Japanese water today. On the north, there 
is but a narrow strip of water between the 
mainland and Sakhalin Island. This may 
be crossed in small boats. To the east, lies 
the chain of Japanese islands, and to the west, 
stretch the coasts of Korea and Siberia. 
Through this sea, Japan might obtain two 
approaches to Europe, one through the Ko- 
rean port of Fusan, and the other through 
Vladivostok. Expansion into Siberia would, 
therefore, be more natural and more profit- 
able than the sending of immigrants across 
the Pacific to distant lands. In this way 
also, Japan would be spared the embarrass- 
ment of coming into unpleasant conflict with 
Occidental nations. 



CHAPTER VI 
WHAT JAPAN WANTS AT HOME 

From the date of her national foundation up 
to quite recent times, Japan has been an 
ardent admirer of ^'Things Chinese." For 
approximately three centuries, Yedo, present 
Tokyo, was the seat of the last Shogunate 
Government. Situated on the seashore, about 
three miles west of this capital, there is a 
small town called Shinagawa. In those days, 
many prominent scholars preferred Shina- 
gawa to Yedo as a place of residence because, 
as they explained, the latter was three miles 
nearer to the center of civilization, which 
was China. The re-opening of the country 
by Commodore Perry in 1854, marked the 
beginning of a great change in Japanese 
ideals. In a surprisingly short time Japan 
was transformed through the eager haste of 

her people to adopt Occidental civilization, 

95 



96 What Japan Wants at Home 

while ruthlessly discarding everything Ori- 
ental, Japanese art and even the study of 
Japanese history, not excepted. 

As Occidental civilization spread, new cus- 
toms and new methods took root. Japan 
became so changed that even Occidental 
forms of military organization and civil ad- 
ministration were adopted and developed. 
Finally, in 1890, a constitutional form of 
government, based on Western principles^ re- 
placed the old monarchical form. 

Thus did Japan devote a period of about 
forty years to reconstruction and domestic 
development. Her policy during that time 
may be compared to that of the United States 
prior to the Spanish-American War, when 
the latter strictly adhered to the letter of the 
Monroe Doctrine and took no part in inter- 
national affairs beyond the confines of the 
American continents. Though Japan made 
wonderful progress at home during this pe- 
riod of internal development, still, prior to 
1894, she was comparatively unknown to the 



What Japan Wants at Home 97 



world. Her success in the war against China 
made her a recognized power. However, 
she was merely an Asiatic power until 1905, 
when the defeat of Russia caused her to be 
recognized as a world power. Yet, for an- 
other decade, she bore but an empty title, 
and it was not until the close of the Great 
War in 1918 that she was able to take a hand 
in settling questions of world import. Thus, 
in the brief space of 64 years did Japan rise 
from an unknown Oriental nation to a lead- 
ing world power. Still Japan today is in no 
position to rest upon her laurels and con- 
gratulate herself upon success achieved, for 
she is now entering upon one of the most 
critical periods of her history. Whether she 
will be able to maintain her present position 
or whether she* will again become a second- 
rate nation depends largely upon how she 
meets the various and perplexing problems 
now before her. 
The most vital of her domestic questions 



98 iWhat Japan Wants at Home 



is to what degree the principle of democracy 
should be adopted in Japan. Both govern- 
ment and people want to have the nation far 
more democratic, though the government is 
more cautious and less radical than are the 
people as a whole. However, none can deny 
that the nation is permeated with the prin- 
ciples of democracy. This Is evidenced by 
the fact that up to some fifty years ago, the 
Emperor and the Imperial Family were re- 
puted to be direct descendants of the gods, 
many of the common people really believing 
that the Emperor was a personage of such 
transcendent glory that one would lose his 
eyesight should he look upon the face of his 
majesty. Because of this, the Imperial Fam- 
ily and the Court Nobles were formerly 
called "Cloud Men" because they were so 
high above the people that it was impossible 
to reach them. Although with the progress 
of the nation, this idea has gradually been 
dissipated, still it obtained to some degree up 



What Japan Wants at Home 99 



to th^ time of the Great War.^ At the time 
when the* present Emperor, Yoshihito, was 
Crown Prmce, he made a personal visit to 
Korea. The* Japanese people regarded this as 
a great departure, as it was the first time that 
any heir of the Imperial Family had ever 
left the confines of the homeland. If one 
compare this little journey with the tour of 
Europe by the present Crown Prince, who 
not only interviews newspaper correspond- 
ents, but on one occasion even went in person 
to a jewel merchant to select a handsome 
necklace as a gift to his mother, we can 
readily imagine to what extent even the Im- 
perial Family itself has been affected by 
democratic ideas. 

Though successful in a measure, and ap- 
parently quite aggressive in the eyes of Occi- 
dentals, Japan's foreign policy is a prolific 

^ It was not unusual for stern military men like Yama- 
gata and Oyama, or even the up-to-date politician, Prince 
Ito, to shed tears of gratitude when the Emperor spoke 
words of gratitude regarding the service they had ren- 
dered. 



100 What Japan Wants at Home 

source of dissatisfaction in the homeland. 
Since the modern Japanese Government was 
founded, no man holding the Portfolio as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs has been popu- 
lar during his incumbency, although such 
men as Matsu and Komura have, since their 
demise, been regarded as astute diplomats. 
The people clamor continually for the gov- 
ernment to adopt a firmer and more strenuous 
foreign policy. 

The unpopularity of the foreign policy 
may be attributed to the fact that Japan is 
never free from controversy with other na- 
tions. In the first place, for a period of 
about forty years, ending in 1894,^ Japan 
made a series of unsuccessful attempts to 
revise her treaties with Occidental nations, 
with a view to effect the abolition of extra- 
territorial rights and the restoration of her 

^In 1894, England agreed to so revise her treaty of 
Commerce and Amity as to restore to Japan her customs 
rights and to surrender extraterritorial rights. How- 
ever, it took several years for Japan to obtain similar re- 
visions of her treaties with the other nations. The revised 
treaties did not become operative until 1899. 



;What Japan Wants at Home 101 



customs tariff rights. Each failure elicited 
stormy protests from the people. Then, when 
in 1895, after the successful termination of 
the Chino-Japan War, the Japanese Govern- 
ment was forced to return the Liao-tung 
peninsula to China, the people were almost 
beside themselves with indignation. Again, 
in 1905, after the defeat of Russia, when the 
people found that the government had weakly 
surrendered, from their point of view, the 
anticipated indemnity, they broke into riot 
and even the eapital city of Tokyo was, for 
several days, practically in the hands of the 
mob with the government unable to regain 
control. When, after the Great War, Japa- 
nese diplomats failed to carry their point 
with regard to race equality as well as sev- 
eral other points in which the people were 
interested, another count was added to the 
unpopularity of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs. It is possible that the high-handed 
policy of the famous Twenty-one Demands, 
though probably not exactly what the people 



102 What Japan Wants at Home 

wanted, was adopted by the government in 
order to regain the confidence of the people. 
In other words, China became the goat 

Ever since Japan adopted a constitutional 
form of government in 1890, the people have 
clamored for the extension of the franchise. 
As late as up to the end of the Great War, 
Japanese adult males who paid an annual 
direct tax of five dollars or more were the 
only persons entitled to vote at national elec- 
tions. From an Occidental standpoint, a 
five-dollar direct tax is exceedingly small. 
However, this was not the case in Japan, 
when viewed from the economic standpoint 
of that time. Because of this limitation, only 
about one and one-half millions out of a pop- 
ulation of fifty millions were entitled to cast 
a ballot. The present members of the House 
of Representatives were elected under this 
system of franchise. In fact, the so-called 
constitutional government of Japan has long 
been in control of the moneyed class. Because, 
after the Great War, democracy became the 



.What Japan Wants at Home 103 



common slogan of the people, in 1919 the 
Japanese Government reduced the amount of 
the tax required to $1.50. Under this new 
arrangement, about seven million men now 
have the right to vote. However, the Japa- 
nese people as a whole are still dissatisfied, 
and demand unrestricted popular franchise. 
Although the government has shown some 
inclination to accede to the popular demand, 
at the same time the government cannot see 
why the new system of franchise should be 
abandoned without having been given a 
single test. Whether to grant an unrestricted 
franchise is one of the great questions of the 
day in Japan, because expenses of election 
campaigns in Japan are beginning to rival 
those in the United States. The number of 
voters being limited, it is possible for candi- 
dates to purchase votes. Though strictly 
prohibited by law, this practice is difficult to 
detect and control. The granting of an un- 
restricted popular franchise is strongly advo- 
cated by many Japanese on the ground that 



104 ,What Japan Wants at Home 

it would not only be the just thing to do but 
that it would go far toward eliminating 
bribery in elections. Opponents of the unre- 
stricted franchise urge, on the other hand, 
that the intellectual condition of the masses 
of the people has not yet reached a standard 
that would make the unlimited franchise 
feasible. At any rate, one of the things at 
home that Japan wants most earnestly is an 
extension of the franchise. 

As in other nations, the Labor Question 
in Japan is daily becoming more grave and 
more perplexing. Prior to the outbreak of 
the Great War, however, open conflict be- 
tween Capital and Labor was a thing un- 
heard of in Japan. This was due to the fact 
that up to that time, the employer was the 
master, whose duty it was to protect, and the 
employe was the servant, whose duty it was 
to obey. In consequence, a fixed wage in each 
trade was scarcely possible. Such organiza- 
tions as labor unions did not exist; in fact, 
they were practically prohibited by an article 



What Japan Wants at Home 105 



in one of the laws. As a rule, employers 
raised wages to correspond with the increase 
in the cost of living. This, however, was 
done voluntarily and was regarded by em- 
ployes as an act of kindness. Although 
strikes were not entirely unknown in these 
pre-war days, the cause of a strike might 
generally be traced to ill-treatment of workers 
by their foremen, rather than to the wage 
question. Since the Great War, conditions 
have entirely changed. During the war 
Japan became one of the world's centers of 
supply. Factories sprang up like mushrooms 
and, in consequence, workers became very 
scarce. Naturally labor rose to a position of 
power and importance and wages soared. 
One strike followed another in the process 
of wage adjustment. With the close of the 
war and the gradual restoration of industries 
in war-torn countries, Humpty Dumptywise, 
Japanese foreign trade took a great fall. One 
factory after another closed its doors and 
the principal industrial cities teemed with 



106 What Japan Wants at Home 

the unemployed. For a time, there were no 
more strikes in Japan. Yet, because the cost 
of living did not descend with the shortage 
of work, labor became desperate, and the 
means of obtaining a livelihood became a 
life and death question. At the same time, 
with the introduction of Occidental ideas, 
Japanese laborers learned of the eight-hour 
law and of improved working conditions. 
Consequently, riots of the unemployed and 
strikes in which the workers demanded an 
eight or even a six-hour law have become 
frequent in manufacturing cities. Sometimes 
many thousands of laborers have marched 
the streets in a body and have fought with 
the police. In extreme cases, laborers have 
driven off the managers and overseers of 
factories, and, in imitation of what has been 
done in Italy and in other parts of Europe, 
have attempted to run the plants themselves. 
The conflict between labor and capital in 
Japan today is therefore something undreamt 
of a year ago. 



.What Japan Wants at Home 107 



As a nation, Japan wants to solve the 
problem in some reasonable way. However 
the Japanese laborer is rather a man of all 
trades than a specialist in any one. Further- 
more, he fails to differentiate between his 
own time and that of his employer. For 
example, the Japanese carpenter, while at 
work, not only smokes and talks, but files 
his saw and sharpens his tools on his em- 
ployer's time. It never occurs to him that 
he ought to have sharpened them before 
coming to work. During the afternoon, he 
sits down and has tea and cake. Conse- 
quently, four Japanese carpenters working 
eleven or twelve hours a day barely accom- 
plish as much as do two American carpenters 
in an eight-hour day. Such being the condi- 
tion, should the Japanese labor leaders, af- 
flicted with a smattering of Occidental knowl- 
edge, who are inciting the people to demand 
an eight or a six-hour day, be successful and 
attain their ends, it would speU disaster to 



108 What Japan Wants at Home 

Japanese industry.^ Before making such 
demands it is imperative that laborers change 
their methods entirely. If they are to work 
but eight hours, they should come prepared 
to actually work and accomplish something. 
The foregoing offers some explanation of 
why, when difficulties arise between labor 
and capital, the Japanese Government almost 
invariably protects the capitalist even to the 
extent of calling out the troops in the event 
of the police being unable to cope with the 
situation. Although this attitude of the gov- 
ernment is both criticized by progressive 
Japanese and denounced by Occidental labor 
unions, yet, for the time being, it is the only 
policy that can be wisely pursued. Labor, 
however, is steadily gaining in many respects. 
Though at present, Japan does not rival 

^ Conditions in Japan cannot be evaluated upon an 
Occidental basis. To illustrate, the city of Tokyo is 
probably the most expensive place in the world to live, if 
one lives in Occidental style. At the same time, in the 
municipal restaurant at Tokyo, a workingman with a good 
appetite can get a meal of all the rice, fish, vegetables, 
and tea he wants for ten sen (a nickel in U. S. money). 



What Japan Wants at Home 109 

the United States, either industrially or com- 
mercially, however, taking advantage of her 
geographical situation, she wants to expand 
along these lines in China and in other Far 
Eastern countries. If proper steps be taken, 
ere long, Japan will outrival the United 
States in these lines. It is a well-known fact 
that, from the foundation of the Empire, 
Japan has been an agricultural nation, but, 
as already stated, she is rapidly changing 
from an agricultural to an industrial nation. 
Yet, by the skilful adoption of modern 
methods, her agricultural products have been 
tremendously increased. Nevertheless, like 
England, she realizes that sufficient cannot 
be produced on her own soil to feed her 
population. Therefore, she wants to apply 
the modern agricultural methods adopted in 
the homeland, to the soils of China, Korea, 
and Manchuria. Being a race that cannot 
exist without rice, the Japanese have even 
introduced their methods of rice cultivation 
into Texas and California. At present, there 



110 (What Japan Wants at Home 

is a movement in Japan to import rice from 
California. 

Occidentals greatly misunderstand Japan's 
attitude toward the question of disarmament. 
Even today, several months prior to the 
opening of the Disarmament Conference, 
Japan has already taken steps along this line. 
That is, the government has announced that 
the naval force will be reduced one-fifth, the 
same to take effect on September 1, 1921. 
However, Japan does not purpose to be a 
nation entirely unprepared for war. As a 
method of precaution, the government has 
made it compulsory for all students, begin- 
ning with the seventh grade, to take as a 
required subject, six years of military train- 
ing, of a character similar to that being given 
in most of the State Universities in the United 
States. There is also a strong movement 
in Japan to extend this military training to 
students in the Government Universities and 
even to those of private universities and col- 
leges, by contributing toward the budgets of 



iWhat Japan Wants at Home 111 

such institutions. Furthermore, students in 
all marine and nautical schools are trained 
in naval science. 

Because of Japan's system of subsidizing 
shipping, all the large ships belonging to 
private companies would be immediately 
placed at the disposal of the government for 
transport purposes in event of war. Conse- 
quently, according to Japan's plan of dis- 
armament, in times of peace, the whole 
nation, with the exception of the regular 
standing army and navy, is engaged in peace- 
ful occupations, while in time of war, it may, 
within a few months, be transformed into a 
fighting unit. Should the limitation of arma- 
ment be satisfactorily effected, Japan would 
be greatly benefited thereby. The major 
portion of the annual expense of tlie standing 
army and navy (about 60% of the entire 
income of the nation) would then be availa- 
ble for educational, commercial and indus- 
trial purposes. At the same time, Japan 
would practically become a country in which 



112 What Japan Wants at Home 

every man was a trained soldier. To a cer- 
tain extent, this would also hold true of the 
United States. 

The question of religion is among those 
that trouble Japan most. After Buddhism 
was introduced in the middle of the 6th cen- 
tury, it practically became the national re- 
ligion. After the introduction of Catholicism 
in 1548, it became wide-spread, and continued 
to be a powerful religion for nearly a century. 
When, in 1638, Japan entered upon' a period 
of seclusion, the nation nominally became 
thoroughly Buddhistic. In order to be a 
Japanese subject at that time, it was essential 
that one be a Buddhist. Wher. Japan was 
re-opened to the world, the government 
tacitly consented to the re-introduction of 
Christianity. Ere long, Protestant as well 
as Catholic missionaries were at work in 
Japan. Although nearly three-quarters of 
a century has since elapsed, the propagation 
of the doctrines of Christianity has made but 
slow progress. In 1918, the total number of 



.What Japan Wants at Home 113 



Christians in Japan proper, including Catho- 
lics, Protestants, the Salvation Army, the 
Y. M. C. A. and the Y. W. C. A., and all 
other Christian organizations, reached only 
188,239, which is less than four-tenths of one 
per cent of the population. In the same 
year, the total number of Buddhist priests 
was 125,525; and the number of Shinto 
priests was 70,537. Thus the Buddhist and 
Shinto priests taken together far outnumbered 
the Christian converts. Even today, Japan 
is nominally a Buddhistic nation. From the 
standpoint of numerical strength, Christian- 
ity is indeed a negligible element. Yet, in 
actual working power, it has proven far 
otherwise. None can deny that at present 
in Japan, a surprisingly large number of 
the men in political, educational, commercial, 
and industrial activities are native Christians. 
Furthermore, Christianity is gaining in 
strength year by year. Yet, judging from 
past experience and from present prospects, 



114 What Japan Wants at Home 

the conversion of Japan into a Christian 
nation seems all but hopeless. 

At the same time, to think of Japan as a 
Buddhistic nation is misleading. Japan has 
long been indifferent to religion. Neverthe- 
less, the hearts of the people are restless 
within them and are yearning today for re- 
ligion. What sort of religion Japan will 
eventually adopt is a hard question. The 
old system of Japanese ethical teaching has 
been weighed in the balance and found want- 
ing. While the portrait of the Emperor is 
still placed in every public school, and the 
children are taught to reverence it as a sacred 
object, this semi-patriotic religion is steadily 
losing ground; for democracy and blind loy- 
alty cannot long dwell together. 

Although Japan does not make the Chris- 
tian missionaries entirely unwelcome, yet she 
is somewhat dissatisfied with the present 
missionary system. The collection of a few 
cents apiece from Sunday school children 
for mission work in foreign countries, includ- 



[What Japan Wants at Home 115 

ing Japan, gives those children the impres- 
sion that Japan ranks with Africa, Turkey, 
and the South Sea Islands. This is indeed 
humiliating to Japan. Every nation has a 
dark side to her national fife. When solicit- 
ing funds in their homelands, returned mis- 
sionaries frequently present only the more 
wretched aspects of Japanese life. There- 
fore, while the Japanese are glad to receive 
preachers who come to Japan on their own 
account or on money donated by men of 
wealth, it is embarrassing to have mission- 
aries sent to them on money collected in the 
churches according to present methods. Ja- 
pan today is the center of education in the 
Far East. Students come to her from China, 
India, Russia, and even from the Philippines. 
During the high tide of the boycott, the 
number of Chinese students was reduced to 
but a fraction of normal; still more than 
3,000 remained in Japan. Therefore, as far 
as education is concerned, the schools con- 
ducted under the auspices of the mission 



116 What Japan Wants at Home 

boards are quite unnecessary. Though Japan 
welcomes funds donated by foreigners, what 
she wants is to have her own Christian 
churches and her own Christian schools sup- 
ported by her own people, and independent 
of foreign mission boards. Some progress 
has already been made along this line, nota- 
bly by the Methodists. 

In Japan, as in most other nations, females 
constitute almost half of the population. 
Therefore, to define the status of woman and 
to determine upon a suitable method of mar- 
riage are among the things that Japan wants 
to do today. The status of woman has under- 
gone great vicissitudes since the foundation 
of the Empire. In the primitive period, 
although the Japanese woman recognized a 
species of plural marriage as the right of her 
husband, because of the national necessity of 
perpetuating the family line, yet at that time 
woman in Japan had far greater freedom and 
incomparably more rights than did women on 
the Asiatic continent. It was not unusual in 



[What Japan Wants at Home 117 



time of war for the army to be divided into 
two parts; one commanded by the husband, 
the other by the wife. 

However, through the contact of the Japa- 
nese with people from the continent, and 
especially with the introduction of Confucian- 
ism and later of Buddhism, woman gradually 
lost her prestige. Finally, when Japan en- 
tered upon the Feudal period, at the end of 
the 12th century, woman lost practically all 
her rights and privileges. She was kept 
secluded from the outside world and looked 
upon merely as a chattel in the home of her 
husband. When a castle was stormed, it 
was the common practice, during the darker 
period of Feudalism, for the women taken 
captives to be divided along with the other 
spoils among the victors. Even in the more 
enlightened period of Feudalism, woman 
was a being whose duty it was to be faithful 
and obedient to her husband. She was ex- 
pected to obey his command, no matter what 
it might be. Moreover, she was frequently 



118 iWhat Japan ^Vants at Home 

handed from one husband to another without 
her wishes being considered. It was quite 
common for an Emperor or a Feudal lord 
to give his concubine to a civil or a military 
officer in recognition of efficient service. On 
one occasion in making a gift of this sort, an 
Emperor said, "I am about to present you 
with a beautiful woman who, within a few 
months, is to become a mother. If the child 
is a girl, I will take it. If it is a boy, you 
must adopt him and make him your succes- 
sor." On another occasion, a famous general 
learned that the Emperor had a very beau- 
tiful woman named Iris among his concu- 
bines. Therefore he determined to render 
some distinguished service with a view to 
obtain her. Finally, he succeeded, and the 
Emperor consented to give him the woman. 
When he came for her, the Emperor lined 
up a dozen beautiful women, among whom 
was Iris, and told him that if he was able 
to pick her out he might have her. The 
general then composed a poem which he sang 



,What Japan Wants at Home 115! 



before them saying, "All the ladies before 
me are as beautiful as the Iris flower. Poor 
I, amazed by beauty, have lost the sense of 
judgment and cannot tell which is the real 
Iris." Thereupon, Iris smiled and blushed, 
and the general ran up and claimed her. 

Throughout the Feudal period, woman 
was trained to render every possible service 
to her husband, even to the point of ignoring 
her own existence. 'About the close of the 
16th century a decisive battle was to be 
fought. A young general who had a loving 
wife returned home just before starting to 
the front, to bid her good-by. Soon after 
he reached the military camp, he received 
a letter from his wife. Coming within such 
a short time after the interview, it greatly 
surprised him. Upon opening it, he read, 
"Our two brief years of married life have 
been a dream of joy. You have been so 
kind and thoughtful and gentle. Today, you 
again made me happy by coming to tell me 
that you were going to battle, possibly to die 



120 What Japan Wants at Home 

bravely and to reflect glory upon the name 
of your family. However, after you had left 
me, I had a fear that my husband might 
let his thoughts linger upon me, a poor, help- 
less woman, to be left alone in the world. 
Lest such thoughts should prove a stumbling 
block in your path to glory, and in order 
that I may not stand in your way, I am now 
about to put an end to my life. Therefore, 
when this letter reaches you, I shall no longer 
be in this world, but shall be awaiting your 
coming to join me in the future life." 

In those times, the Japanese girl was 
trained to believe that she had been born into 
this world for the sole purpose of becoming 
a wife. Marriage was regarded as much a 
matter of course as birth or death. After 
marriage, woman had to respectfully and 
devotedly serve her husband as well as her 
parents-in-law, to whom she owed unquestion- 
ing obedience. In case a marriage should 
prove unhappy, there was no means of secur- 
ing a divorce through the courts or any other 



>What Japan Wants at Home 121 

government agency. The sole authority to 
write a letter of divorce resided in the hus- 
band. In case of his refusal, the wife was 
obliged to remain with Him. Therefore, 
during the 16th century, a sympathetic and 
influential woman obtained permission from 
the government to establish a nunnery with 
the understanding that if any woman, unhap- 
pily married, should seek refuge in that 
nunnery and spend three years of pure life 
there, at the expiration of that time, she 
should be free. This solitary nunnery con- 
stituted the only means in all Japan of a 
woman's securing a divorce without the 
consent of her husband. 

These conditions persisted until 1873, at 
which time the government adopted, to some 
extent, the Western idea of permitting a 
woman to get a divorce through the court, 
providing her father or other male relative 
present her case. Since this step was taken, 
Japanese women have gradually gained fur- 
ther rights. Since the Chino-Japan War, 



122 What Japan Wants at Home 

because of economic changes and the need 
of industrial workers, woman has become an 
important factor in industry. [Also with the 
advance of education and through contact 
with Occidentals, her position has been fur- 
ther elevated. In 1899, when the Japanese 
Government promulgated a civil code, 
woman was given equal rights with man in 
the matter of divorce. However, a double 
standard of morality is still recognized. If 
the wife be proven immoral, or even if there 
be strong ground for suspicion, it constitutes 
sufficient ground for divorce. On the other 
hand, the wife may not secure a divorce pro- 
vided her husband supports her, no matter 
with how many other women he may have 
relations. This condition obtains at present. 
!As to education, in so far as intellectual 
education is concerned, the government pro- 
vides six years of elementary education and 
four years of secondary education for girls. 
Although there are a fair number of colleges 
and other higher schools for women, they 



IWhat Japan Wants at Home 123 



are all private institutions. With the excep- 
tion of a limited number of professional 
schools, the government itself has established 
no higher schools for women. Since the 
Great War, however, there has been a marked 
change, both government and people having 
emphasized higher education for women. 
Leading private universities have adopted 
co-education, and the government is at present 
planning to introduce a co-educational system 
into its universities. 

Since the Great War, also, marriage and 
divorce have been carried to extremes. Some 
women protest the right to propose marriage; 
others even advocate free love. There is also 
a movement among women to have the gov- 
ernment rule that a sort of alimony shall be 
granted by the courts to divorced women. A 
demand is, moreover, being made by women 
that the Eugenic Law should be applicable 
to man only and not to members of their sex. 
They are even planning to get a law enacted 
by which, unless a man shall have provided 



124 What Japan Wants at Home 

himself with a health certificate at the time 
of his marriage, he cannot thereafter claim 
to be legally married. The pendulum, hav- 
ing swung to such extreme, the people of 
Japan, earnestly desire to have the relation- 
ships of the sexes clearly and sanely defined, 
and strictly regulated by law. 

Although Japan today is thus entering 
upon a really serious period of transition 
along many lines, those familiar with her 
history, basing their conclusions upon the 
past, predict that she will come out victor. 
The development of Japan has been effected 
by the adoption of ideas borrowed from 
foreign civilizations: 

First, by the introduction of civilization 
from Korea in the primitive period. 

Second, by the introduction of Chinese 
civilization in the 7th, 8th, and 9th centuries. 

Third, by the introduction of Occidental 
civilization through America in the 19th 
century, when Japan became modernized 



What Japan Wants at Home 125 



and was enabled to take her place among 
the great nations of the world. 

Fourth, by the introduction of newly- 
created radical ideas since the Great War. 

Each transition has involved struggle; 
Japan is now battling with the foam-capped 
waves of the latter. In the past, howevei; 
no other nation has succeeded in so effectively 
amalgamating foreign civilizations with her 
own. Because Japan has emerged trium- 
phant from each preceding transition, even 
though the present adjustment may cover a 
period of some years, there is ample reason 
to be optimistic with regard to the ultimate 
outcome. 



CHAPTER VII 

WHAT JAPAN AND OTHER NATIONS 
SHOULD DO 

Japan is today one of the members of the 
Supreme Council of the League of Nations 
and is entitled to express her opinion with 
regard to even purely European questions. 
Furthermore, her acceptance of the invitation 
of the United States to be represented at the 
Disarmament Conference was a matter of 
great weight. While she is to be congratu- 
lated upon her rapid rise, at the same time 
none can deny that today Japan is in a very 
precarious condition both diplomatically and 
with regard to domestic questions. Soon 
after becoming a member of the family of 
nations in the middle of the 19th century, 
she undertook to reorganize her army and 
navy and place them upon an Occidental 
basis. The success of her efforts in military 

127 



128 What Japan Should Do 

lines is attested by her attainments in the 
Chino-Japan War, the Boxer Uprising, the 
Russo-Japan War, and in the Great World 
War. However, much of the credit for her 
marvelously rapid rise is due to her methods 
of diplomacy. 

While of interest to Occidentals, Oriental 
diplomacy, like Oriental life and civiliza- 
tion, is hard to understand. Unless Occiden- 
tals be conversant with Oriental history, 
usages, and methods of thought, they cannot 
comprehend the purposes and intents of Ori- 
entals. Both Japan and China have twofold 
purposes in their diplomacy. Moreover, 
both nations have well-organized systems of 
propaganda in Occidental countries. Be- 
cause of this. Occidentals who lack a knowl- 
edge of Oriental history or who have obtained 
but a fragmentary knowledge of the Orient 
through the reading of magazine articles or 
of books published by propagandists, are 
easily misled. 

For many centuries, because of their geo- 



What Japan Should Do 129 



graphical situation, there has been a more 
or less continual interchange of thought and 
culture between China and Japan. Conse- 
quently, one who would understand the di- 
plomacy of Japan, should study it in the 
light of that of China. This holds especially 
at present, because the Far Eastern question 
largely concerns China. Moreover, in order 
to comprehend the Korean, Manchurian, or 
Shantung questions, one must inquire into 
the diplomatic policies of China as well as 
of those of Japan. Both of these nations 
employ dual systems of diplomacy. 

When China has difficulty with an Oriental 
nation, her first step is to delay negotiations 
as long as possible. While thus dodging a 
settlement of the question in hand, she skil- 
fully maneuvers to gain the sympathy, or if 
possible, the assistance of a far-off nation. 
Therefore ^Tuan Chiao Chin Kung" are 
familiar traditional terms in China. This 
expression may be translated, "Cultivate the 
friendship of a distant nation in order to 



130 What Japan Should Do 

get the better of a nation nearby." The most 
masterful piece of work accomplished in 
accordance with this method of diplomacy 
was that of Li Hung Chang, when, at the 
close of the Chino-Japan War, China as a 
humble and defeated nation, signed the Shi- 
monoseki treaty, by which she acceded to the 
demands of Japan and made many conces- 
sions. At the same time, by his unparalleled 
diplomatic tactics, Li Hung Chang brought 
about the interference of three European 
nations and thus compelled Japan to hand 
back her chief prize, viz., the Liao-tung 
peninsula. 

If one closely studies the Shantung ques- 
tion, he cannot fail to note the activity of 
the Chinese in the United States. In this 
connection also, China is well able to pursue 
this line of diplomacy. In the first place, the 
aggressive policy of Japan is a much-discussed 
question in Occidental nations. On the other 
hand, China's helpless condition readily 
arouses sympathy, particularly in the United 



What Japan Should Do 131 



States, where it is characteristic of the gov- 
ernment as well as of individuals to help 
the under-dog. China, for the past few years, 
has been a veritable under-dog, because with- 
out exception, she has gotten the worst of it 
in all her dealings with Japan. Jealousy is 
a fault common to both men and nations. 
Japan, which was a submissive and obedient 
pupil of the United States up to a quarter 
of a century ago, has gradually risen to be a 
strong nation. Though mistakenly so, many 
Americans look upon her as a rival of the 
United States. As magnanimous as is the 
United States, certain of her statesmen can- 
not help but regard Japan with suspicion. 
Therefore, China has found in this country 
a rich field for her diplomatic policy. 

Now as to the Shantung question; in 1915 
China signed the Twenty-one Demands of 
Japan. Then when the Peace Conference 
convened in 1919, she unleashed all sorts of 
wild propaganda in the United States. For 
instance, "The Outlook" printed an author- 



132 What Japan Should Do 

ized statement of Mr. Wong, the Chinese 
delegate to the Peace Conference, in which 
he said that according to the Shantung agree- 
ment in the Peace Treaty, Japan would 
practically enslave 40,000,000 Chinese in 
Shantung province. He further stated that 
the Japanese might train these Chinese in 
military tactics and thus create a strong army 
which would bring great menace to the 
world. Now let us see how so fantastic a 
statement was accepted by prominent Ameri- 
cans. So brilliant and keen a statesman as 
Senator Hiram Johnson made the following 
statement in an address before an audience 
of several thousand people, on October 3, 
1919, in the Shrine Auditorium, Los Angeles, 
California. ''With the consent of the United 
States, 60,000,000 Japanese have annexed 
40,000,000 Chinese and China's richest prov- 
ince." So ill-founded a statement was made 
in spite of the fact that about the same time 
President Wilson was in San Francisco ex- 
plaining the real nature of the Shantung 



What Japan Should Do 133 



question and basing his statements upon a 
scholarly and historical background. 

When Japan received an invitation from 
President Harding to attend the Disarma- 
ment Conference at Washington, she mis- 
understood the real attitude of the United 
States, mainly because of the wild rhetorical 
attacks made in the United States Senate 
with regard to the Shantung question. Next 
had come the Yap question. Close upon the 
heels of this came the invitation to attend 
the Disarmament Conference. From the 
Japanese point of view, this was the begin- 
ning of an extension of the Monroe Doctrine 
by the United States to the Far East. Al- 
though at first there was great suspicion and 
nervousness in Japan, the sky has since 
cleared, and the frankness and sincerity of 
President Harding are beginning to be ap- 
preciated. Therefore, Japan has now gladly 
accepted the invitation and is planning to 
take an active part in the conference. Be- 
cause she desires to appear at the conference 



134 What Japan Should Do 

with "clean hands," she has undertaken to 
effect a settlement of the Shantung question 
to the satisfaction of China, and has made 
known her intention to withdraw her troops 
from Siberia. She is, moreover, desirous of 
making some compromise with the United 
States on the Yap question before the opening 
of the conference. However, because Japa- 
nese diplomacy has not changed its hue, it is 
possible that the Japanese delegates may 
summarily withdraw from the Conference 
in case something detrimental to the interest 
of Japan in the Far East is done. 

Japan, like China, has a dual system of 
diplomacy that far outrivals hers, though it 
is of an entirely different type. With the 
Orient, Japan uses her hands and feet; with 
the Occident, her head. When Japan deals 
with Occidental nations, she is careful, cour- 
teous, and compromising, while at the same 
time she closely guards her own interests. 
Sometimes she even goes to the extreme of 
bowing low and evincing great humility. 



What Japan Should Do 135 



This is well-exemplified in the Gentlemen's 
Agreement with the United States, by the 
terms of which Japan not only agreed to 
refuse to issue passports to either skilled or 
unskilled laborers desiring to migrate to the 
United States, but even went so far as to 
apply the same restriction to Mexico, for 
fear that laborers landing in that country 
might cross the border. Later, when Ameri- 
can statesmen complained that Japanese were 
crossing the border from Mexico into the 
United States, the Japanese Government vol- 
untarily issued strict instructions to Japanese 
representatives in South American countries 
to discontinue the endorsement of passports 
of Japanese desiring to go to Mexico. She 
further instructed all steamship companies 
not to sell tickets to Japanese desiring to re- 
turn to Japan from South America, provided 
they wanted to stop in Mexico. Notwith- 
standing the fact that Japan has assumed a 
humble, compromising attitude, she, at the 
same time left a large-sized loophole through 



136 What Japan Should Do 

which, in spite of the fact that the Japanese 
Government has adhered strictly to the letter 
of the agreement, female laborers have been 
constantly entering the United States. 

Japanese agricultural laborers on the Pa- 
cific Coast furnished the motif for the 
Gentlemen's Agreement. At the time of the 
drafting of this agreement, the Japanese 
Government v^as cognizant of the fact that 
in Japan, woman, whether married or single, 
constitutes an important element in agricul- 
tural labor.^ Therefore the Japanese Govern- 
ment has reason to class a woman marrying 
a Japanese agriculturist in California as a 
laborer, and passports ought not to be fur- 
nished to such. Notwithstanding this, when 

^ In Japan, rice is more than a staple. It has been a 
custom from time immemorial to observe a festival known 
as the Mitauye Matsuri, at all the important Shinto 
shrines. This is a festival for the planting of rice in the 
sacred field that belongs to the shrine. The planting is 
all done by maidens. Likewise, in the actual fields of 
Japan in the season of the rice planting, the work is al- 
most all done by women, married or unmarried. In the 
ceremony of this spring festival, woman is unmistakably 
regarded as a laborer. 



What Japan Should Do 137 



Japanese residing in the Pacific Coast States, 
whether laborers or no, desire to get brides 
from Japan, the Japanese Government readily 
provides the women with passports. After 
landing in America, these wives both bear 
children and work in the fields. While their 
babies are still infants in arms they fre- 
quently put them down in the field beside 
them and resume their work. Such being 
the condition, contrary to the expectations 
of Americans on the Pacific Coast, Japanese 
laborers have greatly increased in number. 

From this arose the Picture Bride ques- 
tion in 1920. In this instance again, the 
Japanese Government apparently made vol- 
untary concessions and promised to issue no 
more passports to women desiring to come 
'to the United States to marry Japanese 
laborers. Therein again was left a loophole, 
for the Japanese Government did not promise 
to refuse to issue passports to the United 
States to women whom Japanese laborers 
should return to Japan and marry. There- 



138 What Japan Should Do 

fore, Japanese agriculturists and others have 
hit upon the plan of purchasing round-trip 
tickets to Japan and returning to America 
with their brides. This method is operative 
at present, and the question of the influx of 
Japanese female laborers is again engaging 
the serious attention of Californians. At the 
time of this writing the Japanese are bringing 
almost as many brides into the United States 
as came before the stopping of the Picture 
Brides.^ 

If Japan desires to retain the respect and 
confidence of the United States, she should 
refrain from issuing a passport to any woman 
desiring to emigrate to the United States 
unless it can be clearly proven that her pros- 
pective husband has sufficient means to sup- 

^ "The Japanese American," published in San Fran- 
cisco, March 3, 1921, contained an account of an inter- 
view with Mr. White, Chief of the Immigration Bureau 
in San Francisco, in which he said, "The steamer that 
has just arrived from Japan brought forty newly-married 
Japanese women. This number is about the same* as the 
average when Picture Brides were permitted to come. 
This is to be explained by the fact that the Japanese are 
now going to Japan and bringing wives back. with them." 



What -Japan Should Do 139 



port her as a wife, without requiring her 
to labor outside of the home. For the pur- 
pose of deciding to whom passports should 
be issued, the income tax records of the 
United States might, perhaps, be utilized. 
For instance, the Japanese'Government might 
refuse to issue passports to women who have 
the intention of marrying Japanese, returning 
from America for the purpose of matrimony, 
unless the income of the would-be husband 
for the three years preceding had averaged, 
say, $2,000. Should some such method, to- 
gether with those suggested in Chapter I of 
this treatise, be adopted by the United States, 
all loopholes in so far as immigration is 
concerned, would be effectively plugged. At 
any rate, in a broad sense, Japanese immi- 
gration has already been practically stopped. 
Therefore, movements in the United States 
for the exclusion of Japanese, in which so 
many prominent men are taking part, not 
only invite the ill-will of Japan, but at the 



140 What Japan Should Do 

same time cause great misunderstandings 
among Americans. 

Such acts as the recent forcible deportation 
in the night of Japanese laborers from Tur- 
lock, California, which had it not been for 
the prompt action of both the State and the 
Federal governments would have brought 
serious trouble between Japan and the United 
States, may be traced to American misunder- 
standing of agitation for exclusion. Certain 
senators have fostered a movement in Cali- 
fornia for the putting up of signs, "No Japa- 
nese Welcome Here." In consequence, the 
common people have naturally come to re- 
gard it as their prerogative to forcibly throw 
out Japanese employed in their vicinity. It 
seems unfortunate that the entire question 
of Japanese exclusion should not be left 
wholly in the hands of the Federal Govern- 
ment. 

Retaliation, divorced from the idea of re- 
venge, is doubtless one of the best methods 
of solving international difficulties, especially 



What Japan Should Do 141 



of the sort that arise between Japan and the 
United States. For instance, the recently- 
enacted Foreign Language School Law in 
California, though there is room for im- 
provement, seems to approximate the ideal. 
By this law, California requires that all 
teachers in Foreign Language Schools have 
a fair knowledge of the English language 
and of American History. It further pro- 
vides that classes shall not be held in session 
for more than one hour per day, six days 
per week. In contrast to this, many Foreign 
Language Schools are conducted by foreign- 
ers in Japan who know little or nothing 
either of the language or the history of Japan, 
and who are in nowise controlled by Japanese 
law. For example, an English Language 
School was recently organized in Yokohama 
with a fund contributed both by foreigners 
and Japanese. When the school building 
had been completed and the school opened, 
it was not only run full school hours by 
'American and English teachers, but Japanese 



142 What Japan Should Do 

children and those born between Japanese 
and foreign parents were refused admission. 

Another example of a case in which the 
principle of retaliation would be effective 
in smoothing over difficulties concerns the 
land that formerly constituted the foreign 
settlements. This land is held, leased, trans- 
ferred, and inherited without the payment of 
any fees to the Japanese Government except 
a very nominal land tax. Recently, foreigners 
residing in these districts have bitterly com- 
plained to the Japanese Government of the 
inefficiency of the police system in those 
parts. This scarcity of police may be ac- 
counted for by lack of revenue from those 
districts, the rate having been fixed in 1878. 

While the Japanese in the United States 
apparently obey the law, they at the same 
time ferret out all possible loopholes for get- 
ting some advantage. Foreigners in Japan, 
on the other hand, particularly the English- 
speaking people, are high-handed and seek 
to make themselves masters. Consequently, 



What Japan Should Do 143 



it might help to straighten things out if both 
the Japanese and the United States Govern- 
ments should be in perfect accord and should 
adopt similar sets of laws to be applied to 
the people of either in the country of the 
other. 

Then should residents of either country- 
find the regulations inconvenient, all they 
would have to do would be to complain to 
their home government. Thereupon, through 
international negotiation, the laws might be 
so modified as to satisfy all concerned. 

If we compare Japan's Occidental species 
of diplomacy, as illustrated by the Gentle- 
men's Agreement, with that of Japan in 
Asia, he can readily see that she pursues 
two distinct lines of diplomatic tactics; one 
in the Occident, the other in the Orient. In 
case of necessity in the Orient, whether Ja- 
pan be right or wrong, she never hesitates 
to trip and bring about the downfall of her 
opponent. On numerous occasions, she has 



144 What Japan Should Do 

threatened to appeal to military force in case 
her wishes were not complied with. 

Her Oriental diplomacy, that in which 
she uses her hands and her feet, is exemplified 
in her dealings with Korea. First, she caused 
Korea to declare herself independent of 
China; then she made her a protectorate; 
next she brought about the abdication of 
the Korean Emperor; and finally, she an- 
nexed the peninsula. Although each step 
was apparently taken by the voluntary ac- 
tion of Korea, facts prove that in each 
instance Korea was made to clearly under- 
stand that unless she pursued a course in 
keeping with the wishes of Japan, military 
force would be employed. With China also, 
since the Russo-Japan War, in all her diplo- 
matic negotiations, ending with the famous 
Twenty-one Demands, Japan has gained her 
points by threatening military force. 

Now, turning to the question as to whether 
the relation of China to Japan is comparable 
to that of Mexico to the United States, we 



What Japan Should Do 145 



find that many Japanese publicists stoutly 
defend the affirmative. Of course, the simi- 
larity is striking. Yet Japan must acknowl- 
edge that the United States, for the space 
of a century, has insisted that all nations 
recognize the operation of her Monroe Doc- 
trine not only with regard to Mexico but 
even with regard to all Central and South 
American nations. 

In contrast to this, Japan has not only 
recognized the Open Door policy in Asia 
for the past twenty years, but by the terms of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan con- 
tracted to safeguard the political and com- 
mercial interests of Asiatic countries. One 
can therefore easily detect the difference 
between the relation of China to Japan and 
Mexico to the United States. However, by 
the Ishii-Lansing Agreement, the United 
States recognized Japan's special interests in 
China, provided China's sovereignty should 
not be affected thereby. Such being the case, 
while on the one hand maintaining the Open 



146 What Japan Should Do 

Door policy in China, the United States Is 
bound to recognize Japan's special privileges 
along commercial and industrial lines. 

It is a matter of common knowledge that 
the population of Japan is increasing at a 
very rapid rate. Where to house her off- 
spring is therefore a vital question v^ith her. 
Can she find room in China? Not to ad- 
vantage; because, China being an older 
nation is already over-populated in some dis- 
tricts, while everywhere, even in Manchuria, 
which is more sparsely settled, Chinese labor 
is cheaper than Japanese. What then pre- 
vents the Japanese from settling in Korea? 
After the annexation, a strong agricultural 
company for the sending of farmers to Korea 
was organized under the financial protection 
of the Japanese Government. Through the 
efforts of this organization, in conjunction 
with the improved civil administration, the 
agricultural products of Korea have been 
greatly increased and many new products 
introduced. However, as far as immigration 



What Japan Should Do 147 



is concerned, but little headway has been 
made. Though not so old a country as China, 
still Korea antedates Japan by many cen- 
turies. In consequence, her soil is densely 
populated and affords but little opportunity 
for Japanese expansion. Apparently, there- 
fore, the only country on the Asiatic continent 
where the field is open, is Siberia. 

One of the questions strongly confronting 
Americans is how permanent peace may be 
maintained between the United States and 
Japan. As a first step, each nation must 
recognize the civilization of the other as 
highly developed along its own peculiar lines. 
Second, each nation must know that the 
people of the two races cannot amalgamate. 
Third, both nations must make the Pacific 
Ocean a boundary line. Fourth, both Ameri- 
cans and Japanese should realize that great 
benefit may be obtained by studying the 
civilization of the other. It is advisable that 
prominent men of both nations visit the 
countrv of the other. However, brief trips. 



148 What Japan Should Do 

while they satisfy curiosity and occasionally 
promote trade, bring no permanent results. 
The establishment of the exchange professor- 
ship system between universities, though cer- 
tainly of some value, accomplished little more 
than to introduce new lines of knowledge 
and establish certain friendships within lim- 
ited circles. 

If bankers and other men of means botK 
in Japan and in the United States should 
subscribe to a fund to be used toward inter- 
national betterment, such fund might be 
apportioned among several universities, to be 
used as prize money in intercollegiate debates 
on Japanese subjects. Annual debates of 
this nature would not only arouse the interest 
of the public in general, but they would at 
the same time make possible the presentation 
of Japanese questions in their true light. 
Furthermore, a substantia^ sum should be 
raised in each of the two nations for the pur- 
pose of sending university graduates to the 
country of the other to study there for at 



What Japan Should Do 149 



least three years. Men of this type, equipped 
with a good educational foundation and being 
full of ambition and vigor, would be able to 
do research work without bias, and upon 
returning home, would become leaders of 
thought and interpreters of the life of the 
country in which they had sojourned. After 
a decade or two of such exchange of students, 
there would be men in both countries capable 
of handling questions of state intelligently, 
and untold benefits would be reaped. 

If the Pacific Ocean be taken as the boun- 
dary line between Japan and the United 
States, it will be a matter of prime impor- 
tance for each of these nations to recognize 
the other as the leader across the waters. 
That the United States is the leading power 
in the Western Hemisphere is an established 
fact. However, Japan is merely regarded as 
the strongest and most advanced nation in 
Asia. Therefore, some means must be devised 
whereby Japan shall become the recognized 
leader in the Orient. ^ The first step in this 

1 



150 What Japan Should Do 

direction can be taken only after Japan has 
established amicable relations with China. 
For more than a score of years, Japan has 
financed China, educated her young men in 
Japanese schools and colleges, and sent emi- 
nent Japanese to be advisers of China in 
military and civil lines. Nevertheless, the 
two nations are becoming more and more 
estranged, and at any time there may be open 
conflict. Some common ground upon which 
both nations may compromise must be found. 
The carrying out of the Shimonoseki treaty 
in its original form would pave the way for 
the settlement of many difficulties. Accord- 
ing to the terms of this document, China 
voluntarily ceded the Liao-tung peninsula, 
exclusive of Port Arthur, to Japan at the 
close of the Chino-Japan War. Thereupon, 
Germany, Russia, and France, under pre- 
tense of maintaining permanent peace in the 
Orient forced Japan to hand back this penin- 
sula to China. This accomplished, these 
three powers immediately set themselves to 



What Japan Should Do 151 



obtain slices of Chinese territory. One 
trouble followed another, climaxing in the 
Boxer Uprising and the Russo-Japan War. 

Today, although Japan has obtained im- 
portant leases and railroad concessions in 
Manchuria and encroached far into the in- 
terior of China, yet neither the Japanese nor 
the Chinese are satisfied with present con- 
ditions. To meet the present situation, China 
should surrender the territory in Liao-tung 
according to the terms of the Shimonoseki 
treaty, thereby making that peninsula an 
integral part of the Japan'ese Empire. Then, 
Japan taking the lead, extra-territorial rights 
in China, the control of the Chinese customs 
and post office, and the right to fix tariff 
rates, which properly belong to China as an 
independent nation, should be restored to her 
by all nations now in control of the* same. 

Foreign mining, railroad, industrial, and 
other concessions which are held by many 
nations in various parts of China, among 
which Japan is prominent, should be retained 



152 What Japan Should Do 

by these nations in accordance with the terms 
under which they were granted. In all other 
respects, Japan, together with all other in- 
terested nations, should entirely withdraw 
their troops from Chinese territory and sur- 
render all political rights held by them in 
China. Long before the tenures of the va- 
rious aforesaid concessions expire, the United 
States will doubtless have granted indepen- 
dence to the Philippines, either complete or 
under a protectorate. Then the Pacific Ocean 
will become a real boundary line between 
Occidental and Oriental nations. This hav- 
ing been accomplished, race equality, which 
does not necessarily entail freedom of emi- 
gration to the country of the other, but im- 
plies rather that all persons already resident 
in any country or who may be admitted in 
future, shall enjoy equal rights and privileges 
with the natives of that country, will be 
practicable. The move made by Japan at 
the Peace Conference in Paris in demanding 
race equality without first recognizing race 



What Japan Should Do 153 



equality among Asiatic peoples and without 
raising her own economic standard, was 
inevitably of no avail, notwithstanding that 
from the standpoint of justice and humani- 
tarianism the question itself had strong 
grounds for being supported by all nations. 

History repeats itself. Japan today is very 
much like the Japan of the beginning of the 
17th century. While possessed of the geo- 
graphical advantage of being far away from 
other great powers, Japan finds -that circum- 
stances will not permit of her being isolated. 
For this reason, it is her policy to seek the 
friendship of some other nation. Therefore, 
after the war with China and Korea at the 
close of the 16th century, Japan entered into 
treaty relations with Korea on most humble 
terrns. Consequently, because of this bent 
toward alliance/should Japan be disregarded 
by the leading nations and left entirely to 
herself without friends or allies, it would 
not be surprising if she should come to 
some understanding with the Soviet Govern- 



154 What Japan Should Do 

ment of Russia on the Siberian question. 
Later, Germany might be approached. From 
the present trend of things, it may sound 
illogical and improbable that a strong alli- 
ance might be formed by Japan, Russia, and 
Germany. However, should this become an 
accomplished fact, such alliance would be 
one of the most formidable known in history. 
Then weaker nations, such as Poland and 
China, would fall an easy prey, and a second 
world war might be staged. From this point 
of view, the peace of the world pivots upon 
a proper recognition by the United States 
and other great powers of the position to 
which Japan has attained in world affairs. 



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